COMMENTS
THE AUTHORITY OF THE CIRCUIT JUDICIAL
COUNCILS: SEPARATION OF POWERS
IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
INTRODUCTION

The Circuit Judicial Councils, created by the Administrative Office Act of 1939,1 were designed to function as the principal mechanism
for the administration of the federal trial courts. Created primarily to
deal with the mounting problem of delay in the administration of
justice, the councils were expected to take an active supervisory role
in promoting judicial efficiency. For many years, however, the councils
functioned intermittently, if at all, and very little was known about the
specific problems resolved by the councils or the methods used to
achieve solutions.2 Until very recently, the only action of a circuit
judicial council to be officially reported was an examination by the
Judicial Council of the Third Circuit into the business affairs of an
official shorthand reporter in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
This lack of activity was perceived and criticized by several com1 Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 306, 53 Stat. 1224. The provision relating to the circuit judicial councils is now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970), which provides in pertinent
part:
(a) The chief judge of each circuit shall call, at least twice in each year and
at such places as he may designate, a council of the circuit judges for the circuit,
in regular active service, at which he shall preside. Each circuit judge, unless
excused by the chief judge, shall attend all sessions of the council.
(b) The council shall be known as the Judicial Council of the circuit.
(c) The chief judge shall submit to the council the quarterly reports of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The council
shall take such action thereon as may be necessary.
(d) Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit.
The district judges shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the judicial
council.
2 See Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration,
37 U. Cm. L. REV. 203, 203-04, 210-11 (1970). See also Pirsig, A Survey of Judicial Councils,
Judicial Conferences and Administrative Directors, 47 THE BiREF 181, 194-95 (1952).
3 In re Rodebaugh, 10 F.R.D. 207 (Judicial Council of the 3d Cir. 1950); Hearings on
the Independence of Federal Judges Before the Subcornm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1051 (1970) (memorandum from Professor Arthur S. Miller to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., March 31, 1970) [hereinafter cited as
1970 Hearings].
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mentators, many of whom were members of the federal judiciary, as
the apparent failure of the circuit judicial councils to fulfill the high
expectations set for them at their inception. 4 It has recently been recognized, however, that many of the councils have been active in handling certain administrative problems, most of which were more
amenable to resolution through personal contact and informal means
5
than through formal orders issued and made public by the councils.
Problems of a greater magnitude, touching however upon substantive rights, were simultaneously developing in several circuits. In
the Tenth Circuit, the circuit judicial council issued a formal order
denying a United States District Judge the authority to handle any
cases. Although the order was subsequently modified to allow the judge
to decide the cases currently on his docket, the controversy was so rancorous that it twice reached the Supreme Court of the United States. 6
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit7 failed however to
resolve most of the questions raised concerning the powers of the circuit judicial councils because the Court denied Judge Chandler's motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus
directed against the council.8 Nevertheless, this case was a portent of
events yet to transpire.
More recently, in Hilbert v. Dooling,9 a federal district court judge
was ordered, by a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals en banc,
to dismiss a reindictment, as a consequence of the judge's prior violation of a rule of practice issued by the Judicial Council of the Second
4 See, e.g., Brennan, The Continuing Education of the Judiciary in Improved Procedures, 28 F.R.D. 42, 44 (1962) wherein Justice Brennan stated:
Well, after 21 years how stand the Judicial Councils . . . ? If we are to take
the word of some observers, most of them stand just where they did 21 years ago.
They haven't moved off the dime.
Burger, The Courts on Trial, 22 F.R.D. 71, 77 (1958) ("[T]he Judicial Councils have not
fully lived up to . . . expectations."); Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils
in the Administration of the Courts, 47 A.B.A.J. 169, 169 (1961) ("Now, after twenty-one
years, it seems clear that the performance of the councils has fallen far short of what was
hoped and expected.').
5 Two chief circuit judges have acknowledged that informal resolution of problems
was preferred. Formal orders were to be issued only in certain unspecified extreme circumstances which had never previously arisen in their circuits. 1970 Hearings, supra note 3,
at 59, 70 (remarks of Judge Lumbard of the Second Circuit); id. at 356, 366 (remarks of
Judge Aldrich of the First Circuit).
6 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 77-80 (1970) (dismissed on merits); Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966)
(denial of stay).
7 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
8 Id. at 89.
9 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973). See note 251 infra.
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Circuit-a council whose same members comprised the en banc court.1 0
This action was all the more unusual because the application for such
writ was made by the indicted defendant before he had been tried
for the offense."' The Supreme Court denied the judge's petition for
12
certiorari.
At the same time, the Third Circuit heard In re Imperial "400"
National, Inc.,' 3 a case precipitated by an action taken by the Judicial
Council of the Third Circuit which resulted in the removal of an attorney for a reorganization trustee without an evidentiary hearing. It
was contended by the trustee's attorney that the council action was
outside the purview of its functional standard-the general need to
promote "the effective and expeditious administration of the business
of the courts," the end toward which the power to make orders is
granted. 14 The petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the Third Circuit council was denied by the Supreme Court. 15
This comment will analyze the functions and methods of the circuit judicial councils within the context of these cases, particularly In
re Imperial "400" which culminated the litigation in the Third Circuit. In making such an analysis, emphasis will be directed toward the
legislative history surrounding the enactment of the circuit judicial
16
council provision of the Administrative Office Act. Detailed attention

will also be given to the constitutional framework of our federal government of delegated powers, for it is within such framework that the
ultimate power to create the councils and to enforce their orders must
be found. Beyond this analysis, the comment will attempt to suggest
remedies available to the courts and Congress through which such bitter
controversies of the recent past need not recur. Before focusing upon
10 476 F.2d at 357. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1970), text in note 1 supra, with 28
U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970) which provides in part: "A court in banc shall consist of all circuit
judges in regular active service."
11 476 F.2d at 363 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
12 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
'5 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Union Bank v. Nolan, 414 U.S. 880
(1973).
14 Brief for Appellant at 17, In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.
1973); see 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970). Other aspects of this litigation are reported in: Nolan
v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 406 U.S. 956 (1972) (denial of stay); Nolan v.
Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 409 U.S. 822 (1972) (motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus denied); Nolan v. Judicial Council of the
Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J. 1972) (action for declaratory judgment and mandamus), aff'd sub nom. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied
sub noma.Union Bank v. Nolan, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
15 Union Bank v. Nolan, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Judicial Council of the Third Circuit v.
Nolan, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
16 Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 306, 53 Stat. 1224.
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the scope of the current powers of the circuit judicial councils, the
first matter to be examined will be the enacting legislation and the
state of the administrative machinery of the federal judiciary at that
time.
THE STATUTORY BASIS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Prior to 1922, there was no organized machinery within the judiciary for the management of the federal courts. Consequently, the dis-

trict courts possessed a great deal of autonomy in administrative matters.
Each district judge was the "king in his own district." 17 The responsibility for the business and financial affairs of the federal courts, however, rested with the Department of Justice which, through its growing
bureaucracy, fostered a system of "economy, efficiency, simplicity, uniformity, and centralization" at the expense of district court autonomy.' 8
At the same time, the individual courts were experiencing severe
growing pains. Chief Justice Taft, speaking at the annual meeting of
the American Bar Association in 1922, decried the mounting appeals
docketed in the federal appellate courts and the failure of those courts
to maintain their dockets in a current state.' 9 Calendar congestion also
plagued the lower federal courts. In response, during the year of 1922
Congress enacted a law creating a unified judicial system for the federal courts which provided for the transfer of judges to districts that
were laboring under excessive caseloads. The Act also established the
first administrative machinery within the judicial branch-the Judicial
20
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges.
17 Lumbard, supra note 4, at 170. Chief Justice Taft in an address once stated that it
was an "absurd condition ... under which each district judge has had to paddle his own
canoe and has done as much business as he thought proper." Taft, Reform in the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 6 J, AM. Juo. Soc'y 36, 37 (1922). For a recent
treatment of the development of federal judicial administration, see P. FisH, THE PoLrrIcs
oF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1973).
18 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 292 (statement of Professor Peter G. Fish); see
Burger, supra note 4, at 76 n.5. See also P. FISH, supra note 17, at 91-124.
19 Taft, supra note 17, at 37-38. The problem of appellate congestion was not relieved
until three years later, with the passage of the Judges Bill, Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229,
§§ 237, 240, 43 Stat. 937-38 (now codified, in part, as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 1257(3) (1970)).
This legislation narrowed the scope of Supreme Court review of both federal and state
cases by the expansion of discretionary review-the statutory writ of certiorari.
20 Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 838. The Judicial Conference was empowered to "submit such suggestions to the various courts as may seem in the interest of
uniformity and expedition of business." Id. at 838-39. For an analysis of the statute, see
Chandler, The Administration of the Federal Courts, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 182, 184
(1948); New Law Unifies FederalJudiciary, 6 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 69 (1922). See also P. FIsH,
supra note 17, at 40-90.
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In its formative stages, the powers of this body were somewhat
limited. 21 As a result, many of the problems which were instrumental
in the establishment of the Judicial Conference were still evident nearly
twenty years later. Additionally, the district courts, though still largely
autonomous, remained responsible to the Department of Justice for
their general business and financial management.22 Therefore, near the
end of the 1930's, further attempts were made in the Congress to fortify and streamline the management and supervision of the judicial
branch.
In 1938 the Ashurst Bill, 28 sponsored by Attorney General Cummings, was introduced in the Congress. The principal objectives of
this legislation included both the withdrawal of the business and financial responsibility for the federal courts from the Department of Justice, and the provision, within the judicial branch, of a mechanism
for securing improved supervision of the work of the trial courts. In
accomplishing these goals, the Ashurst Bill would have centralized most
of these functions in the Supreme Court of the United States. 24 The
1938 Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, while recognizing
the need for improved judicial supervision and the advantages of locating that responsibility within the judicial branch, believed that cenThe name of this organization was changed from the Judicial Conference of Senior
Circuit Judges to the Judicial Conference of the United States. The provision is codified
as 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). A "senior circuit judge" is now entitled a "chief judge of a
judicial circuit." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 32, 62 Stat. 991. "Senior judge" status,
which is conferred upon retired federal judges, was created by the Act of Aug. 25, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 294, 72 Stat. 849 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 294(b) (1970)).
21 The original Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges was empowered to
"make a comprehensive survey of the condition of business in the courts" and to "prepare
plans for assignment and transfer of judges ... where the state of the docket ... indicates
the need therefor," and to "submit such suggestions to the various courts . . . in the
interest of uniformity and expedition of business." 42 Stat. at 838-39. Today, however,
the Conference among its other duties, has the responsibility to
carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of
practice and procedure . . . as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other
courts of the United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). In addition, the Conference is to recommend "changes in and
additions to those rules" and to consider reports on "the business of the several courts of
the United States" when such reports are requested from the Attorney General. Id.
Moreover, the Conference often discusses other matters not delineated in section 331.
See, e.g., 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 4-6 (remarks of Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.);-id.
at 67 (remarks of Judge Lumbard).
22 See Chandler, sura note 20, at 186.
23 S. 3212, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). This bill was introduced Jan. 11, 1938 by
Senator Ashurst. 84 CONG. RPal. 304 (1938).
24 H.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1961). See also P. FISH, supra note 17,
at 125-65.
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tralization of all such authority in the Supreme Court would be
undesirable. It was feared that thrusting the Court and Chief Justice
into local controversies might subject the Court to harsh and unwel25
come criticism.
Responding to this apprehension, Chief Justice Hughes subsequently proposed an alternative plan which was thought to preserve
the desirable attributes of the Ashurst Bill, but at the same time permit
decentralization of supervisory functions. 26 The Chief Justice alluded
to the judicial circuits as the " 'foci of Federal action from the judicial
standpoint for supervision of the work of the Federal courts.' ",27 He
proposed that the individual circuits, rather than the Supreme Court
and Chief Justice, be delegated the responsibility to efficiently manage
the operation of the district courts within the circuit, including the
"power and authority to make [circuit] supervision all that is necessary to induce competence in the work of all of the judges of the
various districts ....,,28
Noting the progress of the states in creating judicial councils to supervise the work of their courts, Chief Justice Hughes suggested " 'that
there should be in each circuit a judicial council.' "29
It was also thought that the creation of a system of judicial councils organized at the circuit level would alleviate the problems resulting from the remoteness of a centralized administration from the
federal district courts. As proposed by the Chief Justice, the great comparative advantage that the councils would have vis-A-vis the Supreme
Court was based upon supervision by those who possessed detailed
knowledge of matters transpiring within their respective jurisdictions.
While the Supreme Court was removed from the daily activities of the
district courts, seeing but an occasional appeal, the circuit judges had
more frequent contact with those courts and, consequently, possessed
the detailed working knowledge requisite to effective judicial superH.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
Id. In 1937, a year prior to the Ashurst Bill, a judicial reform bill had been introduced in Congress. S.1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). Part of this bill would have created
an administrative officer for the federal courts. Another provision was President Roosevelt's
celebrated "court-packing" plan. This legislation, of course, was never enacted. It is,
perhaps, due to that trauma that the Court feared the reaction from injecting itself into
local matters. See A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION 30 &
n.3 (1949); 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 372 (remarks of Professor Peter G. Fish).
27 H.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961) (quoting from Transcript of the
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference, Sept. 30, 1938).
28 Id.
29 Id.
25

26
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The Judicial Conference created a committee to prepare legis-

lation
"having in view the incorporation of the provisions of the present
bill looking to the transfer of the budget.., to the administration
of the courts . . . and, likewise, embracing a provision looking
toward the establishment of judicial councils... within the several
circuits ... for the control and improvement of the administration
of justice therein."8 1

At the congressional committee hearings which were convened
in both houses to consider the proposed legislation, many members of
the Conference Committee testified regarding the purposes underlying
the legislative proposal. Chief Justice Groner of the District of Columbia Circuit,8 2 testified that the Judicial Conference recognized the
80 H.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961). This same feeling was echoed by
various witnesses at the committee hearings convened to evaluate the Administrative
Office Act:
Last year's bill has a provision in it which I personally thought was exceedingly
dangerous, because I thought it might be construed to centralize [the power] here
in Washington ....
[T]hose are some of the reasons for the administration being more effective
inside the circuit, and that is the reason why this bill was changed from what
might have been a central administration by a single individual [the Chief Justice]
in Washington ....
Hearings on S. 188 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 23-24 (1939) (remarks of Chief Justice Kimbrough Stone of the Eighth Circuit)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 188].
[I] would like to point out that the present bill has a great advantage over the
bill that was introduced last year . . . in that it does not attempt to centralize all
the business affairs of the Federal courts in Washington, but rather creates a
system of decentralization in recognizing the circuit courts of appeals . . .as the
operating units in bringing about the proper administration of justice. This bill
has at least that very great advantage that, the circuit judges being responsible
for the condition of the district courts within the circuits, have it within their
power to know much more about what is going on in that circuit than could the
Chief Justice ... here at Washington.
Id. at 16 (remarks of Arthur T. Vanderbilt).
31 Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Sept. Sess. 1938, in 1938
ATr'y GEN. ANN. REtP. 24 (emphasis added). This committee, in collaboration with a
committee appointed by the Attorney General, prepared a bill which was introduced in
the Senate in 1939. With but minor changes, none of which modified the section concerning
judicial councils, this bill became law (enacted as the Administrative Office Act, Act of
Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 306, 53 Stat. 1224). H.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1961). This act, in addition to creating the circuit judicial councils, also established the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. It was to be the duty of the judicial
councils, as proposed in the bill, to take whatever action necessary to correct conceivable
subjects of criticism in the reports of the administrative officer.
32 The chief judge of that court was denominated "chief justice" by the act creating
that court. Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 1, 27 Stat. 434-35. The title was changed to "chief
judge" by the Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 32, 62 Stat. 991.
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feeling on the part of the judges and a large part of the members
of the bar that there ought to be some method of compiling the
statistics of the work of the courts, and of keeping abreast of the
work by bringing those statistical figures to the attention of some
organization of the courts which could apply corrective measures
when they were necessary.33
The chief justice further observed that the only "criticism of the courts
is due to delay."3 4 Under the procedures then in effect there was
no authority to require a district judge to speed up his work or to
admonish him that he is not bearing the full and fair burden that
he is expected to bear, or to take action as to any other matter
which is the subject of criticism, or properly could be made the
35
subject of criticism, for which he may be responsible.
33 Hearings on S. 188, supra note 30, at 9.
34

Id. at 11.

35 Id. This statement was quoted by Judge Lumbard in his dissent in the most

recent case involving the powers of the circuit judicial councils, In re Imperial "400"
Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41, 52 (3d Cir. 1973). He apparently read the phrase "or properly
could be made the subject of criticism" as reflecting a matter not yet a subject of criticism
yet warranting immediate corrective action. Id. Another interpretation, perhaps more
credible when read in conjunction with the rest of the testimony, maintained that Chief
Justice Groner was referring generally to existing matters of criticism other than delay in
the administration of justice. See Hearings on S. 188, supra note 30, at 12. A third position
was offered by Professor Peter G. Fish, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers, who characterized Chief Justice Groner as an advocate of selfrestraint. The chief justice was seen as a supporter of councils exhibiting very broad jurisdictional powers but with limited authority to resolve problems coming before them.
1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 373. But see A. VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIAL. ON
MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1250 (1952) ("They [the judicial councils] are principally concerned with matters of calendar control'); Chandler, supra note 20,
at 185, in which the first Administrative Director of the United States Courts stated:
The main purpose of the judicial councils in the circuits, as prescribed in
the Administrative Office Act, is to consider the state of the judicial business
within the circuits as shown in the periodic reports of the Administrative Office,
and to take such action "as may be necessary" to correct any deficiencies which
appear in the handling of the work. This may involve advice to the senior circuit
judge in reference to the temporary assignment of judges from other districts
within the circuit to courts in arrears, or a request to the Chief Justice of the
United States for the temporary assignment of judges from other circuits. In some
instances in which district judges have held cases under advisement for excessively
long periods after submission, the judicial councils have directed them to devote
themselves exclusively to the decision of such cases until they were disposed of,
and have arranged for the assignment of other judges to take their current
calendars in the meantime.
Any analysis of the intended purpose and powers of judicial councils must also consider the political temper of the times. In addition to several scandals and complaints early
in the 1930's, the federal courts had only recently escaped from the disaster of the "courtpacking" plan. There was a fear that Congress would abolish the lower federal courts if
the judiciary did not clean up its own house. Chief Justice Hughes, the other prime legislative sponsor, was of the opinion that the councils had to function as a clearinghouse in
dealing with all complaints concerning the activities of the lower federal courts. Other-
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Although much of Chief Justice Groner's remarks were confined to a
consideration of the delay in the administration of justice, his testimony
suggested a need for the councils to possess a capacity for a broad
range of inquiry. Indeed, his primary concern was that the councils
have the ability to confront all criticism which would undermine "the
general and universal confidence of the people in the courts." 86
Similar thoughts were espoused by Judge John Parker,3 7 another
member of the Conference Committee. Judge Parker testified that
"[t]his counsel [sic] can deal with all sorts of questions that arise in
the administration of justice." 38 Moreover, he concluded that the only
limitation on the power of the councils to deal with other matters of
criticism would be "the inherent limitations of the situation."' 9 It is
therefore apparent that the proponents of this legislation were not inclined to restrict the councils' functions to a narrow scope of inquiry.
Nevertheless, it was the creation of the power to act within the councils, not the breadth of their ultimate scope of involvement, that was
to provide the key element to this legislation.
Under the then current system, moral suasion was the only method
by which a judge might be induced to affirmatively respond to criticism
of the functioning of his court. Such entreaties were often made, not
by a judicial colleague, but by the Attorney General in his capacity as
head of the department charged with the supervision of the federal
courts.40 In contrast, the proposed legislation provided an alternative

method through which district judges could be statutorily compelled
41
by the judicial councils to undertake corrective action with dispatch.
wise, the complaints would go directly to Congress which had little power to solve the
problems short of abolishing the courts. Upon this historical context, Professor Fish
concluded that the councils were established to deal with many other problems in addition
to calendar control, including ethical problems that fell short of criminal conduct. 1970
Hearings, supra note 3, at 372-75.
36 Hearings on S. 188, supra note 30, at 9.
37 Hearings on H.R. 5999 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 20-21 (1939) (remarks of Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 5999]; Hearings on S. 188, supra note 30, at 11 (remarks of Chief Justice
Groner).
38 Hearings on H.R. 5999, supra note 37, at 22.
39 Id.
40 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. at 101-02 (Harlan, J.,
concurring); see P. FisH, supra note 17, at 99.
41 Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 306, 53 Stat. 1224, states in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the district judges promptly to carry out the directions of
the council as to the administration of the business of their respective courts.
The current statutory language, as provided by the Judicial Code of 1948, Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 332, 62 Stat. 902, which, according to the House committee report
changed only the phraseology and not the substance of the original section, requires that
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While it would still be true, as the testimony of Chief Justice Groner
had indicated, that a district judge could refuse to obey a council request to render a decision sooner than anticipated, the council would
then have the opportunity and duty to bring the matter to the attention
of Congress, where such failure to comply with the statutory duty of
42
obedience could be effectively sanctioned through impeachment.
The legislative history of the Administrative Office Act demonstrates that the judicial councils were authorized to inquire into the
broad range of administrative problems then plaguing the federal
courts. However no suggestion can be gleaned from the Act's history
that the councils were empowered to directly impinge upon the substantive rights of judges, attorneys, or other court personnel. It seems
clear that the Act was directed toward the judicial administration of
the courts rather than their appellate supervision.
This proposed legislation was finally enacted by Congress in 1939
as the Administrative Office Act. In addition to creating the circuit
judicial councils, the Act also changed the structure of the Conference
of Senior Circuit Judges (now the Judicial Conference of the United
States) and established the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts. 48 These alterations permanently relieved the Department of
Justice of its burdensome financial and administrative responsibilities
on behalf of the judicial branch, and brought together the geographically scattered and administratively independent federal courts into an
organized structure. As part of the legislative scheme, all the new organizations were designed to be contingents of, and operate wholly
within the judicial branch. 4
45
The Act, in conferring power on the circuit judicial councils,
"[t]he district judges shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the judicial council."
28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970). At least one council has assumed that its orders might be
enforced, if necessary, by a mandamus proceeding in the name of the council against the
recalcitrant district judge. See In re Rodebaugh, 10 F.R.D. 207, 217 (Judicial Council of
the 3d Cir. 1950).
42 Hearings on HR. 5999, supra note 37, at 14. Federal judges are "civil Officers of
the United States" for the purposes of the impeachment section of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 4; see Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003,
1006 (1966) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting.)
43 Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 306, 53 Stat. 1224. The attendance at the Judicial
Conference of the United States currently includes: The Chief Justice of the United States,
the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of Claims, the chief
judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and a district judge from each judicial
circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). The structure and duties of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970). See also P. FISH, supra
note 17, at 166-227.
44 See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 306, 53 Stat. 1224.
45 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970). For the text of this section, see note I supra.
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described them as being composed of "the circuit judges for the circuit, in regular active service" in addition to the chief judge of the
circuit.48 By defining council membership in such a manner, rather

than as the court of appeals, en banc, 47 it appears that Congress intended that the judges who serve as council members do so in their
individual capacities, rather than sitting as a court. This impression
is consistent with the determination that a judicial council functions as
48
a body distinguishable from a federal court.

The Act's authorizing statute, currently section 332, confers but
two express powers upon the councils. First, they possess power to
take necessary action upon the quarterly reports of the Administrative
Office. 49 Second, the councils have the capacity to "make all necessary
orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business
of the courts."8 0 However, various provisions governing the federal
courts, enacted since 1948, require circuit judicial council participation
in additional activities related to judicial management. These activities
may range from the approval of court quarters to the certification of
the permanent disability of a judge. 51
46 28 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1970). For the text of this section, see note 1 supra.

28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970). The text of this section provides in pertinent part:
A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service. A circuit
judge of the circuit who has retired from regular active service shall also be competent to sit as a judge of the court in banc in the rehearing of a case or controversy if he sat in the court or division at the original hearing thereof.
It is important to note that the statute creating the councils, id. § 332(a), note 1 supra,
does not permit a retired judge to sit as a council member.
Proposals have been made to include a district judge as a member of the council.
Such a composition would clearly distinguish the councils from a court of appeals en banc.
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 83 n.5 (1970).
48 E.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n.7 (1970);
In re Rodebaugh, 10 F.R.D. 207, 215-16 (Judicial Council of the 3d Cir. 1950).
49 28 U.S.C. § 332(c) (1970). For the text of this section, see note 1 supra.
50 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970). For the text of this section, see note 1 supra.
51 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 62(b) (1970) (power to remove a referee in bankruptcy for cause);
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1970) (power to approve plans for furnishing representation to certain criminal defendants); 28 U.S.C. § 134(c) (1970) (power to order a district judge to reside in a particular part of the district to which he was appointed); id. § 137 (power to
issue orders assigning the business of a district court where the district judges cannot decide on a division of business); id. § 140(a) (power to require council consent to a pretermission of a regular session of a district court); id. § 142 (power to approve the General
Services Administration's provisions for judicial accommodations and court quarters); id.
§ 295 (power to require council consent to the designation and assignment of judges to
other courts); id. § 372(b) (power to certify to the President of the United States that a
judge is incapable of efficiently discharging his duties due to a permanent mental or
physical disability); id. § 457 (power to direct the location of court records).
47
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In Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit,52 the first
major case involving a consideration of the powers of the circuit judicial
councils, the Supreme Court appeared to view the role of the council
as that of an'administrative agency. 53 Although Chandler did not in-

volve the operation of section 332 exclusively, the importance of the
decision is magnified by its stature as the sole Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject. Subsequent cases in the lower federal
courts which have dealt with the provisions of section 332 have treated
orders issued thereunder as orders of an administrative body. 54 To permit analysis of the constitutional validity of such orders it is necessary
to review the powers granted by the Constitution to the federal courts
and to the judges appointed to sit on those courts.
JUDICIAL POWER-THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION

The desire of Chief Justice Hughes and other members of the
Judicial Conference's drafting committee to maintain administrative
control of the federal courts through a mechanism located entirely
within the judicial branch might well have originated in the doctrine
of separation of powers. This doctrine, which represents the basis of our
constitutional system of a government of delegated powers, is not expressly mentioned anywhere within the Constitution itself. However,
the separation of powers doctrine is nonetheless evident in the structure
55
and language of that document.
52 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
53 The Court stated:
We find nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the Judicial Council
was intended to be anything other than an administrative body functioning in a
very limited area in a narrow sense as a "board of directors" for the circuit.
Whether that characterization is valid or not, we find no indication that Congress
intended to or did vest traditional judicial power in the Councils.
Id. at 86 n.7. The Court appeared to be unsure of itself on this point. It would seem
highly unusual that such an important matter would be relegated to a footnote because
the Court held that authority to issue a writ of mandamus in this case is limited to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 86.
54 E.g., In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41, 45 (3d Cir. 1973).
55 See, e.g., National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91
(1949), in which the Court stated:
The doctrine of separation of powers is fundamental in our system. It arises,
however, not from Art. III nor any other single provision of the Constitution,
but because "behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates
which limit and control."
(quoting from Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)). Pursuant
to the structural scheme of the Constitution, article I contains the powers and limitations
of Congress; article II enumerates the powers and limitations of the Executive; and
article III defines and vests the judicial power of the federal government in the Judiciary.
See generally THE FEDERALIsT No. 47 (J. Madison).
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As a consequence of the calamitous experience with the Articles
of Confederation, the Constitutional Convention which met in Philadelphia in 1787 desired a government of delegated powers.58 However,
fearful of the potential havoc caused by an unrestrained national legislature, an independent judiciary was created to ensure that the new
federal government would be able to act directly upon individual citizens as well as against the states.57 The final document delegated
specific areas of responsibility to the respective branches, with each
branch operating as a check and balance upon the activities of the
others. Article III, the Judiciary Article, created the judicial power of
the United States and, as a manifestation of the separation of powers
doctrine, vested such power in an independent judiciary.58 As a result
of this constitutionally mandated policy of independence together with
the self-proclaimed limitations on its own jurisdiction enunciated by
the courts,59 several federal judges have inclined toward the view that
the judiciary possesses an "inherent power." 60 However, unlike state
courts which are often courts of general jurisdiction, the Constitution
has fashioned the federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction. 1
56
57
(2d ed.
58

See C. ROSSITER, 1787 THE GRAND CONVENTION 49-53, 63 (1968).
H.M. Hart & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1
1973).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
59 The Supreme Court has, from time to time, determined not to hear cases or decide
issues as a manifestation of judicial self-restraint and constitutional mandate. Although
prima facie based upon constitutional doctrine, these decisions occasionally are in reality,
more self-protective of the judicial institutions. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962) in which the Court stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is ...
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government . . . or the potentiality for embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
See also A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 125-26, 183-84 (1962).
As to the Court's reluctance to reach certain constitutional issues, see Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
60 See, e.g., 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 67 (remarks of Judge Lumbard). But see
id. at 114, 121, 125 (remarks of Judge Craig).
61 Compare N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 3,
2, which provides
The Superior Court shall have original general jurisdiction throughout the
State in all causes.
with U.S. CONSr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, which provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
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Since the federal courts possess only that limited judicial power expressly delegated by the Constitution, the concept of an "inherent
power" vested in the judiciary would appear to be without constitutional foundation.
The limited power of the federal courts is reflected in many ways.
Because of the strict separation of powers doctrine, the courts have refused to decide cases where the possibility of executive 2 or legislative 63
revision exists. The courts have also refused to consider questions arising under the guaranty clause of article IV, ruling that they have no
power to decide political questions. 4 Thus, the courts have fostered
the concept of judicial independence through their self-regulatory policies as well as through the commands of the Constitution.
The total independence of the judiciary was designed to protect
the courts from external political and social influences. However, the
courts have always been subject to such pressures, and their reaction to
them has often been self-induced. 65 Such reaction can be viewed as an
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to the above enumerated categories.
Congress cannot expand that jurisdiction through mere legislative acts. Hodgson v.
Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809).
62 E.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948)
(presidential power to approve or deny final Civil Aeronautics Board orders relating to
overseas or foreign air transportation precluded final judicial review of such orders); United
States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852) (power of the Secretary of the Treasury to
approve compensation awards precluded final judicial review of such orders); Hayburn's
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (power of the Secretary of War to modify awards precluded
judicial action in those proceedings). But cf. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 167-68
(1950) (Court held that there was jurisdiction to determine whether plaintiff was eligible
for suspension of deportation order although applicable statute permitted Congress to
approve a suspension lasting more than six months). See also THE FEDERALIsT No. 81,
at 503-04 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).
683Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 36 (1865) (no appeal lies from the Court
of Claims to the Supreme Court). There was no explanatory opinion in this case. A draft
opinion had been written by Chief Justice Taney who died before the Court was able to
consider it. The opinion is published in the appendix to volume 117, United States
Reports-Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1864).
64 E.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). This case held that the constitutional guaranty of a republican form of government, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, is enforced
by a congressional decision as to which is the legitimate government of a- state and
whether the government is republican. Therefore, decisions cannot be made by the courts
in adjudications where that clause is in issue. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42-43.
85 The decision of the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
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admission that the pressures are, indeed, felt by the courts. Often times,
these pressures are sustained by the structural sensitivity of the federal
system. In a government of limited powers, the courts can function
effectively only with the concurrence of a second branch of the government. Thus, enforcement of a limitation of the powers of Congress
requires action by the executive, and enforcement of process against
the executive is predicated upon the impeachment power of Congress.6
Without the prospect of a second concurring branch, the courts have
often found otherwise legitimate cases or controversies to be "non6
justiciable." 7
It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts should be highly
sensitive to proposed legislative action affecting the federal judiciary.
However, it is clear that Congress has the constitutional authority to
act forcefully in the judicial arena. In addition to creating a Supreme
Court and an independent judiciary, the first section of article III
delegated to Congress the power to establish the lower federal courts.68
This provision permitted Congress to vest any or all of the jurisdic137 (1803), was, in part, the result of widespread threats of impeachment. See 1 C.

WARREN,

THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 227 (rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as

C. WARREN]. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), pending during the impeachment and trial of President Andrew Johnson, evoked a fear in Congress that the
case would be used to invalidate the Reconstruction Acts. See 2 C. WARREN, supra at
483-84. See also 1 C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888, at 433-514 (1971)
(Volume VI of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the
United States).
66 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (enforced by President Eisenhower
with federal troops); In re Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.), modified sub nom. Nixon v.
Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This subpoena by the Office of the Special Prosecutor
was enforced by the courts. It was apparent that the Congress would back the judiciary as
the Senate Watergate Committee had attempted to enforce its own subpoenas through
the courts. Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973) (enforcement
denied for lack of jurisdiction) and the House Judiciary Committee was moving toward a
presidential impeachment investigation. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison).
67 See, e.g., Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654, 656-57 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(action to compel release of presidentially impounded funds held to be non-justiciable).
Other cases on this subject have reached the merits. E.g., State Highway Comm'n v.
Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1106 (8th Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court has recently agreed to
decide the issue. Train v. City of New York, 42 U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1974). The
courts' reluctance to decide such cases may be traced to the Cherokee Nation Cases of the
1830's. After the Supreme Court had decided the cases, much to the chagrin of President
Andrew Jackson, the President was reported to have said: " 'Well, John Marshall has made
his decision, now let him enforce it.'" 1 C. WARREN, supra note 65, at 759.
68 U.S. CONsT. art. 1II, § 1, provides in part:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.
(emphasis added). See also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, empowering Congress "[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."
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tional grounds, enumerated in the second section of article 111,69 in
those courts and to specifically withhold any or all such jurisdictions at
any time.7 0 Thus, while federal judges may be removed from their office only through impeachment, 71 Congress could, by totally withdrawing federal jurisdiction from the inferior courts, conceivably leave the
judges in office but without business to handle. 72 The federal judges,
as a consequence of their constitutionally guaranteed life tenure may,
in effect, possess a greater independence than the courts on which
7
they sit. a
69 The leading cases on this subject have held that although the jurisdiction of the
federal courts originates in article III, such jurisdiction is dependent upon the enactments
of Congress to transfer it from the Constitution to the courts. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). The earliest case to hold that
Congress may restrict the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts was Turner v. Bank of
North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799) (applying the "assignee clause" of the first judiciary
act to diversity jurisdiction). For an excellent treatment of this congressional power, see
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953).
70 E.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303
U.S. 323 (1938); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). Justice Story had espoused
the contrary view, i.e., that the jurisdictional grant from the Constitution was made
mandatory and obligatory on Congress to vest under its power to create the lower federal
courts. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329-31 (1816). Professor Goebel
had concluded that the Congress was compelled to vest the entire article III jurisdiction in
the inferior federal courts. J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 243 & n.228
(1971) (Volume I of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the
United States).
71 See note 42 supra.
72 Although not occasioned by congressional action, this status formed the gravamen
of the complaint by Judge Chandler in his controversy with the Judicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit. Judge Chandler alleged that such treatment amounted to an impeachment
by the judicial rather than by the legislative branch and was therefore, unconstitutional.
398 U.S. at 77-78, 82. Furthermore, it was reported that Chief Judge Richard Chambers
of the Ninth Circuit once told a Senate committee that
a problem judge could be punished by temporarily assigning him to a "nonexistent place" where court was never held or to a place of court where little judicial business was generated.
Fish, supra note 2, at 230. See also 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 121 (remarks of District
Judge Walter Craig of Arizona).
If Congress can give the councils these powers through 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 532 (1970),
it is, perhaps, unconstitutionally delegating its power of impeachment to the judicial
branch. Of greater import, however, is the potentially fatal effect on our tripartite form
of government that such a condition, whether caused by a congressionally created jurisdictional vacuum or a congressionally delegated power to the circuit judicial councils,
would produce. See note 73 infra and sources cited therein.
73 Of course, Congress cannot tamper with the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), but it apparently can restrict or
eliminate the appellate jurisdiction of that Court if it so desired. Ex parte McCardle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). The "exceptions clause," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, provides:
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It is only when Congress has made the grant of constitutionally
authorized jurisdiction to the courts that the concept of an inherent
judicial power can develop a genuine meaning. This power permits
the courts to decide "cases or controversies" without external interference in the decisional process, and without subsequent revision by
either the executive or legislative branch. Thus, the judicial power
is provided only by the Constitution and it cannot exist outside and
independent of that document's limits. 74 Since the powers of the judi-

ciary ultimately depend upon a congressional vesting of jurisdictional
authority, it would appear that the existence of an "inherent power"
in the courts in an absolute sense would ignore the express limitations
of article III as well as the separation of powers principles demanded
by our government's constitutional framework.
The federal courts, in the absence of a constitutional delegation
and a matching congressional grant of authority, have no "inherent
power" to manage their business through the circuit judicial councils.
Nor could there be "inherent power" to deal with matters outside the
scope of an enabling statute. The second section of article III extended the judicial power, vested by the first section in independent
courts, to "cases and controversies."' 5 Such matters are characterized
by a concrete adversariness which presents a dispute that is ripe and
amenable to judicial resolution. 76 In creating the judicial councils,
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall' be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
(emphasis added).
Several scholars have criticized the holding in McCardle as having embraced an
improper reading of the "exceptions clause." The late Professor Hart suggested that the
holding would "destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional
plan." Hart, supra note 69, at 1365. Professor Berger had concluded that the purpose of
the clause was probably based upon the concern that the Framers felt with regard to the
appellate review of matters of fact. R. BERCER, CONGRESS.v. THE SUPREME COURT 286-89
(1969). For a recent analysis of this case, see Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte
McCardle, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 229 (1973).
However, in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), Justice Harlan, who announced the judgment of the Court, cited McCardle with apparent approval. Id. at 567
(Harlan, J., joined by Brennan & Stewart, JJ.). But in dissent, Justice Douglas remarked:
"There is a serious question whether the McCardle Case could command a majority view
today." Id. at 605 n.1l (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J.).
74 Since courts that are not created pursuant to article III cannot exercise the
"judicial Power of the United States," the article III courts must receive whatever power
they possess from the Constitution through the legislative transfer process (statutory
jurisdictional grants). Cf. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
75 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
76 Thus, the suit must not be collusive, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302
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pursuant to its enactment of the Administrative Office Act, Congress
did not envision judicial implementation of the Act as an adjudicatory
process, but merely as a supervisory process over the business of the
judiciary-an administrative function.7

7

It is possible to conclude,

therefore, that there is no "inherent power" stemming from the Constitution which could flow, through a congressional enactment, to the
circuit judicial councils to enable them to carry out their business. The
creation of such a system however, as the following section will analyze,
is not necessarily repugnant to the Constitution.
Article I Activities in Article III Courts
Congress is empowered by article I "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court, 78s and
[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.7 9
Therefore, Congress can both create lower federal courts and provide
for their administration and supervision. Since there is no specific constitutional restriction against the placement of a mechanism for such
administration within the judicial department, it would appear that the
circuit judicial councils can be created pursuant to the "necessary and
proper" clause. Nevertheless, the question remains whether nonjudicial, non-article III business may be reposed in the circuit judicial
councils which are in their composition the alter-ego of an article III
tribunal. 80
Since Congress possesses the power under article I and its "necessary and proper" clause to create the inferior article III courts, it
should be possible for article I to provide a constitutional basis for the
(1943); Chicago & G.T. Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892). The parties must have standing to litigate, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The case must be ready for judicial
action, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), but not yet
moot, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969); Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Finally, the case must be presented in such a form that
the judiciary can act upon it,e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
77 See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n.7
(1970); In re Rodebaugh, 10 F.R.D. 207, 215-16 (Judicial Council of the 3d Cir. 1950).
78 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
79 Id. cl. 18 (emphasis added).
80 See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
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creation of specialized legislative tribunals. Such early legislative tribunals were created to serve as courts in the territories prior to statehood. Although these courts might possess, de facto, all the powers
possessed by the article III courts,"' they could not be vested with the
"judicial power of the United States" created by that article. 2 Because they did not possess such power, the article I courts (legislative
courts) could not handle article III business within the confines of a
state.m However, the courts within the District of Columbia were empowered, until recently, to hear both article I and article III business
by virtue of the constitutional powers delegated to Congress to govern
the District. 4 This mixture might well serve as the basis for the
authority to delegate non-article III business to the federal courts.
Today, there is no doubt that article III courts have the power
to hear certain article I cases-disputes which are not cognizable under
the Judiciary Article.8 5 Congress' intention to establish an administrative body rather than a judicial tribunal, when it created the circuit
judicial councils, is evident, however, upon review of the legislative
81 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828).
82 Id. at 546. In fact, "[tihey are incapable of receiving it." Id. The constitutional
courts have been vested with some of the judicial power formerly exercised by the states
which they ceded at the formation of the federal government. The territorial courts were
never ceded such power since they were in areas totally under the control of Congress. U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Cf. O'Donoghue v. United Stat s, 289 U.S. 516, 540-41 (1933).
83 Cf. Crowell v. Bensen, 285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932). The whole concept of legislative
(article I) versus constitutional (article III) courts was summarized in Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). See generally Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HAgv. L.
Ray. 894 (1930).
84 O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923). The congressional power to govern the District of Columbia
stems from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. This provision permits Congress to set up
legislative courts in the District. However, since the District was formed by the cession of
lands from two of the original states (Maryland and Virginia), the same powers which
those states gave to the federal courts remaining within their boundaries was transferred to
the District. O'Donoghue v. United States, supra at 540-41.
The court system of the District of Columbia was reorganized in 1970. As a result, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit are exclusively article III courts. The article I
powers of these courts were transferred to two legislative courts, the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. These latter
courts handle no article III business. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 11-101 et
seq., 84 Stat. 475; D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 11-101, 11-102 (Supp. 1970). See Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
The only remaining legislative courts are the Tax Court of the United States, which
was formerly in the executive branch, 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1970), the military courts-martial
and the district courts for Guam, the Virgin Islands and the Canal Zone. C. WRiGHT, LAW
or FEDERAL CouTrs 34 (2d ed. 1970).
85 National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
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history of the Administrative Office Act.86 Moreover, in the first controversy to reach the Supreme Court which involved the construction
of the powers of the circuit judicial councils, the Court apparently
87
accepted such an interpretation.
The merging of administrative and judicial business within an
article III court may however be per se intolerable. Justice Jackson,
speaking for three members of the Court in National Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,88 stated:
Of course there are limits to the nature of duties which
Congress may impose on the constitutional courts vested with the
federal judicial power. The doctrine of separation of powers is
fundamental in our system.
. . And this [legislation] reflects that doctrine. It does not
authorize or require either the district courts or this Court to participate in any legislative, administrative, political or other nonjudicial function .... 89
*

Significantly, the two concurring Justices in Tidewater, necessary for
the Court's five to four majority, shared the dissent's view that article
III courts may not entertain non-article III business under any circumstances9 If the Supreme Court and district courts are not constitutionally permitted to entertain such activities, the courts of appeals, whose active members comprise the circuit judicial councils,
should have no special status. It would appear that should the circuit
judicial councils obtain their administrative authority from a statute
which is not repugnant to the Constitution, they must do so in some
form other than that of an article III court.
The Council as an Article I Activity
While an article III court may not entertain non-judicial article I
functions, there. appears to be support for the position that judges of
article III courts .may participate in such functions, judicial or other86 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n.7 (1970); In re
Rodebaugh, 10 F.R.D. 207, 215-16 (Judicial Council of the 3d Cir. 1950). See notes 17-43
supra and accompanying text.
87 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n.7 (1970).
88 337 U.S. 582 (1949). This case extended certain judicial functions created pursuant
to article I to the constitutional courts outside the District of Columbia. The Court held
that citizens of the District might sue citizens of other states in the constitutional courts
based upon diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 600 (Jackson, J., joined by Black & Burton, JJ.)
[hereinafter cited as Jackson, J., concurring].
89 Id. at 590-91 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
90 Id. at 607 (Rutledge, J., joined by Murphy, J., concurring); id. at 645 (Vinson, C.J.,
joined by Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Reed, J., dissenting).
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wise, in their individual capacities. Judges of article III courts have
been called upon to participate in claims hearings which were subject
to executive revision, 91 sit on high commissions or courts, 2 and render
advisory opinions. 3 Thus, it would appear reasonable to conclude that
the judges of one of the article III courts-the courts of appeals-might
act as individuals while sitting on the judicial councils in carrying out
the mandate of Congress to supervise the lower federal courts. But they
do not so act with any of the judicial power of the article III judges.
Absent such power, the constitutional authority to promulgate enforceable orders to all district judges in a supervisory capacity represents a
question to be answered in the context of the recent challenges to
council action.
THE COUNCILS-ACTION AND REACTION

In re Rodebaugh-CouncilFunctions and Thought
While a discussion of the actions of the circuit judicial councils
might focus initially upon the Chandler decision, there is one reported
instance of a council's action a decade earlier. The Judicial Council of
the Third Circuit wrote an opinion to accompany the council resolution in In re Rodebaugh.0 4 While the resolution, which was directed
to an official court reporter for the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was simple and to the point,95 the
91 See United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
409 (1792).
92 E.g., Justice Roberts served on the commission created to investigate the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor. Justice Jackson acted as chief United States prosecutor at the
War Crimes Trials at Nuremberg. Chief Justice Warren headed the commission which
investigated the assassination of President Kennedy. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 9, 33-35 (1970) (Appendix).
93 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 579-80 (1962) (congressional reference
cases heard by the Court of Claims). These cases are now heard by the chief commissioner
of the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (1970).
94 10 F.R.D. 207 (Judicial Council of the 3d Cir. 1950). The council convened to
investigate the private reporting activities of an official court reporter and to determine
whether the reporter would be required to submit reports on these outside activities to
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Id. at 207.
95 The council's resolution stated:
Resolved by the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit that Everett G.
Rodebaugh, a court reporter for the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, be and he is hereby ordered and directed to submit the
records of his private reporting business since June 30, 1945 to the official examiners of the Department of Justice acting for the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts for their examination and for such report thereon as they
may deem it appropriate to make to the Administrative Office.
Id. at 224.
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analysis of council powers in the opinion provides great insight into
council thinking.
The singular significance of Rodebaugh was the Third Circuit
council's conclusion that it functioned as an administrative body with
administrative powers:
The council is the administrative agency empowered by Congress
to investigate and determine the facts and fashion the appropriate
administrative remedy. Having acted as thus authorized, its orders
have the force of law.96
These powers were to be utilized in an area of responsibility defined
by Congress in section 332. The council construed this responsibility as
a grant of power to insure the efficient and expeditious "administration of the judicial business of the district courts" and not as one to
insure "the legal correctness of the work" of such courts.97 In determining the congressional intent from the language of the Administrative Office Act, the council also concluded that it was empowered "to
consider any phase of the administration of the business of the district courts."

98

Consequently, it is apparent that for more than a decade prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Chandler, at lease the Third Circuit council viewed itself as an administrative body rather than a
court. As such, members of the councils must serve as individuals, not
as circuit judges, since article III courts do not have the constitutional capacity for either legislative or executive functions under the
separation of powers doctrine. 99 This analysis is consistent with the
Third Circuit council's treatment in Rodebaugh until the point at
which that body commenced its discussion of orders and remedies. If
Congress had in fact created the councils to function as administrative
bodies, their power to make orders must have originated in the legislative enactment creating them. Moreover, the power to enforce such
orders must also flow from a congressional delegation of authority.
Section 332 of the Administrative Office Act provides in part that
the "council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts."' 100 This portion
of the statute undoubtedly supplies the power to make such orders,
but the section concludes: "The district judges shall promptly carry
96 Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 215, 216.
98

Id. at 216.

99 See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91 (1949).
100 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970). See note I supra for the complete text.
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into effect all orders of the judicial council."1O1 However, in both
Rodebaugh and Imperial, the object of the council order was not a
judge but rather some other officer of the court. This would assuredly
pose certain problems for the council in ensuring that its order would
be enforced. Because the Third Circuit council (which was involved
in both cases) acknowledged that such a circumstance might well occur,
they appeared to approach a resolution from a judicial rather than an
102
administrative perspective.
The Third Circuit council suggested three possible alternative
procedures to obtain compliance with a council order. The first and
most expedient would be to address the council resolution to the proper
party with a simple request for compliance. This was the procedure
followed by the Third Circuit council in Rodebaugh.10 However, the
problem with this approach arises where the recipient of the council
resolution fails to comply with the order. Unlike district court judges,
other officers of the court have no statutory duty of compliance under
section 332. To compensate for this deficiency, the council proposed a
second alternative. This approach would direct the council's order to
the district court judge charged with the supervision of the affected
court officer. This procedure was adopted by the Third Circuit council two decades later in Imperial.10 4 Since a number of court officers are
removable by district judges under specific statutory authority 0 5 failure to comply with an order of the supervising judge would mandate
the officer's dismissal. The judge's compliance with the council order
is of course mandated by section 332.106 The third and final enforce101 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970).
10 F.R.D. at 216. The council remarked:
Though the orders of the council have the force of law, nonetheless they are
not self-executing. They must, of necessity, be addressed to a judge or other
officer of the court.
Id. A truly administrative body would concern itself solely with the decision at hand.
Enforcement of any eventual orders would be left to the appropriate authority. In concerning themselves with the potential methods for enforcing their forthcoming order the
council thus contemplated the exercise of judicial, rather than administrative power. The
council also noted that once an order is issued under the authority of section 332, its
mandate has the force of law. Id. (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944)).
103 10 F.R.D. at 224.
104 Id. at 217; see In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d at 42.
105 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 601 (1970) (Administrative Director and Deputy Director removable by the Supreme Court); id. § 631(h) (removal of United States magistrates by the
district court).
106 Id. § 332(d). This sanction will be extensively treated within the context of
Imperial, but it should be noted at this juncture that district judges are "pressured" to
execute council orders involving matters with which they were neither concerned nor
responsible prior to the issuance of such orders. This dilemma would appear incongruous
102
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ment procedure discussed by the Third Circuit council within the
context of Rodebaugh was an action for mandamus. Taken in the name
of the council and directed against the recalcitrant recipient of a
council resolution, 10 7 this action was to be brought in the district court
pursuant to the power granted by the "All Writs" provision. 0 8 While
the Third Circuit council envisioned this procedure as a reasonable
one for the enforcement of its orders, it is somewhat questionable
whether the district court would have appropriate jurisdiction in all
instances. 0 9 Even though the contempt power of the district courts
would undoubtedly encourage compliance, this alternative would place
the burden of enforcement upon a previously uninvolved district judge.
The major defect with the Third Circuit council's proposed enforcement procedures is that orders of the district court, either in a
mandamus action or pursuant to section 332, would be reviewable by
the court of appeals."10 Such review would enable the circuit judges
to do indirectly what they could not do directly-to obtain judicial
with the congressional purpose for establishing accountability. Moreover, the councils
may issue orders solely to the end of expediting the courts' business. If the object of the
council resolution chose to forfeit his position rather than comply with the order of the
district judge, the business of the courts might well be impeded rather than expedited.
107 10 F.R.D. at 217.
108 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970), provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
109 The Third Circuit council suggested that an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
(1970) would be
a "necessary" and "appropriate" aid to the jurisdiction of the district court for
the [district] court could not properly exercise its jurisdiction without the proper
functioning of its reporter.
10 F.R.D. at 217. However, that statement misconstrues the applicability of the "All Writs"
Act in the district courts. Before jurisdiction to issue the writ sought would attach, there
must be in the court, jurisdiction to grant some other form of relief. Mclntire v. Wood,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813).
In Rodebaugh, the district court had no such jurisdiction. Although there appeared
to be a controversy between Rodebaugh and the council, the district court was unable to
take cognizance of it. An action in mandamus, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), compelling an
employee of the United States to perform a non-discretionary duty owed to the plaintiff,
would have failed because such a remedy was unavailable in the federal district courts
outside the District of Columbia until 1962. See Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748,
§ 1(a), 76 Stat. 744. Additionally, there was no law of the United States mandating a
reporter's compliance. A civil action, brought in the name of the circuit judicial council,
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), might have failed if the council could not, in good faith, have
alleged the $3,000 (now $10,000) jurisdictional requirement. Thus, the writ sought by the
council would not be "appropriate" for it was, in fact, the only relief sought. Knapp v.
Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 197 U.S. 536 (1905); Mclntire v. Wood, supra. But cj. Stein v. South
Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606 (1968).
110 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
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enforcement of their order without regard to the merits of the council
order. Although Congress possesses the power to define, limit, or even
eliminate the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts,," it cannot direct those courts concerning the manner in which they decide a case or
the weight to be given to evidence which is introduced once jurisdiction is granted. To permit such an occurrence would violate the separation of powers doctrine since the legislature would, by its actions, in112
vade the province reserved for the judiciary.
Similarly, a circuit judicial council could not, in an attempt to enforce a section 332 order, require a district judge to rule in favor of the
council in a mandamus proceeding. The separation of powers doctrine
prevents the council as an administrative or executive body from invading the domain of the judiciary. However, the court of appeals
could accomplish the same end by reversing an adverse judgment or
order from the lower court upon the council's appeal. As the membership of both the council and the court of appeals is identical, the operation of the judicial disqualification statute 18 would ostensibly be a
requisite to the prevention of a miscarriage of justice. Indeed, Judge
Chandler had complained that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had actually acted concurrently as both a court and a council." 14
Therefore, the distinction between the court and council will be given
further scrutiny within the context of the Chandler decision.
Chandler-The Council in the Supreme Court
The acrimony between Judge Stephen Chandler of the Western
District of Oklahoma and the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit"15
Ill

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
Id. at 147.
113 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (disqualification for interest); cf. id. § 47 (disqualification of a trial judge from hearing appeal). 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970) (disqualification for
personal bias) would appear inapposite in most cases.
114 See notes 115 & 128 infra.
115 The Chandler controversy was presaged by a dispute between the Tenth Circuit
council and Judge Willis Ritter of Utah. In United States v. Hatahley, 220 F.2d 666 (10th
Cir. 1955), rev'd, 351 U.S. 173 (1956), on remand, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 899 (1958), the court of appeals strongly recommended the disqualification of
Judge Ritter from a retrial of the damages question in that case because of his manifest
bids and prejudice. 257 F.2d at 925-26. When Judge Ritter refused to acquiesce in the
court of appeals' suggestion, the court then ordered him not to retry the issue. The
mandate to Judge Ritter was the result of both a judicial determination by the court of
appeals and an administrative decision of the circuit judicial council. United States v.
Ritter, 273 F.2d 30 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960); Brief for Petitioner,
Motion to File Reply Brief and Reply Brief at 5-6, Chandler v. Judicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner).
After Judge Ritter had refused to disqualify himself for bias upon motion, an original
112
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culminated in an order of the Tenth Circuit council directed to Judge
Chandler pursuant to section 332, which required the judge to recuse
himself from all the cases on the docket then assigned to him.116 The
order further required that these cases be divided among the remaining judges of the Western District of Oklahoma and that all new cases
be distributed to the exclusion of Judge Chandler. 117 The directive
was based upon the council finding that "'Judge Chandler is presently
unable, or unwilling, to discharge efficiently the duties of his office.' "118
The mandate also referred to civil and criminal actions which had been
instituted against Judge Chandler, as well as to two applications heard
by the court of appeals to remove him from cases where he would
119
not recuse himself.
mandamus action was brought to force the replacement of the judge. United States v.
Ritter, supra. Judge Ritter had informed the counsel for the United States that although
he had noted the recusal suggestion made in the opinion of the court of appeals "he did
not 'intend to follow that suggestion so you can lay that to one side.' " Id. at 32. The
motion was heard by the court of appeals as an original mandamus action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (1970).
The court concluded that it possessed the power to remove Judge Ritter and assign
another judge to the case, either pursuant to the "All Writs" provision or "in the exercise
of the inherent powers of appellate jurisdiction to effectuate what seems . . . to be the
manifest ends of justice." United States v. Ritter, supra at 32 (emphasis added). See
note 157 infra.
Immediately after reaching this decision the court reconvened as the Judicial
Council of the Tenth Circuit and held a hearing at which Judge Ritter was not present.
Following the hearing the council issued a formal order stating that the council had
found Judge Ritter to be biased and prejudiced. The order further directed that he be
removed from the case and that the chief circuit judge designate a replacement. Brief for
Petitioner, supra at 6.
The Ritter controversy was later to be relied upon by both the Tenth Circuit council
in issuing its directive to Judge Chandler disqualifying him from two pending cases, and
by Judge Chandler himself as an example of the illegality of council action.
116 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. at 77-78.
117 Id. at 78. The presentation of facts and discussion of the main issue in Chandlerjudicial removal without impeachment-will receive abbreviated treatment in this
comment. For a more detailed analysis, see Note, Statutory and Constitutional Problems
Relating to Methods for Removal or Discipline of Judges, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 153 (1966).
118 398 U.S. at 77 (quoting from the Tenth Circuit council order). This order was
issued on December 13, 1965, two weeks before Judge Chandler was removed from a case
by the court of appeals. Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
119 The criminal indictment charging Judge Chandler with conspiracy to defraud
the state of Oklahoma was quashed. 398 U.S. at 77 n.4. The civil suit charged Judge
Chandler with malicious prosecution. The judge had testified at a grand jury proceeding
following which, the plaintiff was indicted. The complaint was dismissed based upon the
judge's judicial immunity. O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 926 (1966). Judge Chandler was removed from two cases by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in original mandamus actions. See notes 120-26
infra and accompanying text.

1974)

COMMENTS

841

The first application for removal, Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
1 20 accused the judge of possessing a personal bias against the
Chandler,
applicant while supervising a large corporate reorganization. Following
a hearing, briefs and oral argument, the court of appeals concluded
that the judge was guilty of personal bias and-ordered him removed
from the case.' 2' According to Judge Chandler, the entry of such an
order was opposed by all the original creditors and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 122 Immediately following the entry of the court's
order, the circuit judicial council was convened. The council proceeded
to promulgate an order directing Judge Chandler to recuse himself and
12
requesting the chief circuit judge to assign another presiding judge.
In the second application, Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler,124 the court
of appeals again combined with the council to remove Judge Chandler
from a case over which he had been presiding. Because one of the
attorneys representing the plaintiffs in the case before Judge Chandler's
court had also represented Judge Chandler in an earlier civil damages action, the defendant Texaco petitioned the court of appeals to
remove the judge.125 The court of appeals granted Texaco's request
and an order of the circuit judicial council thereafter removed the
judge from all assigned cases. 1 26 It was the entry of the council's latter
120

303 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963).

121 303 F.2d at 57. This action was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). In

Occidental the court relied heavily upon Ritter. The court took special note of the action
taken therein and the fact that Judge Ritter's requests for relief from the mandate
(Ritter v. United States, 362 U.S. 950 (1960), and Ritter v. Murrah, 362 U.S. 946 (1960))
had been denied by the Supreme Court. 303 F.2d at 56-57.
122 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 115, at 9.
128 Id. at 9-10.
124 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
125 354 F.2d at 656. This action was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
126 354 F.2d at 657; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 115, at 10. In Texaco the court
relied upon both Ritter and Occidental as well as Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d
Cir. 1965). 354 F.2d at 656-57. In Rapp, the Third Circuit held that mandamus was a
proper remedy in the court of appeals to review the denial of a motion for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). The court was careful to distinguish Green v. Murphy,
259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958), which denied the same relief under a claim of actual bias,
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970), on the grounds that: (1) in Green, the denial of petitioner's motion
would have been reviewable on appeal (in Rapp the district court was attempting to
transfer the case out of the Third Circuit), and (2) in Rapp, the court of appeals, itself
had created the appearance of conflict of interest. 350 F.2d at 810.
The court in Rapp adopted a new procedure in mandamus whereby a respondent
judge would be a nominal party and who need not answer in order to controvert the
truth of the facts alleged in the petition. Id. at 812-13. The party prevailing below
would have the burden of vindicating the decision in its favor. Id. The court also refrained
from issuing a'direct order disqualifying the judge:
We know that Judge Van Dusen will fully effectuate these views without the
necessity of our entering any formal order. Petitioners may, however, apply to
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order, which precipitated the filing by Judge Chandler of a motion
for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus
in the Supreme Court. 127 The council order was subsequently modified
when Judge Chandler strongly objected to his removal from cases previously assigned and then pending before him. This latter order permitted the judge to hear those cases assigned to him prior to the
issuance of the first order. All other cases were to be divided among
12
the remaining district judges by those judges. 8
Judge Chandler had not appeared before the council although
he was invited to do so prior to the entry of the second order. He did,
however, file an application for a stay with his motion for leave. 129
The application for a stay was denied as being interlocutory, because
there appeared to be alternative avenues of relief available. 130 Four
years later the Supreme Court finally disposed of the remaining matter
in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit'31 by finding no
13 2
basis upon which to issue the writ sought by Judge Chandler.
Perhaps the most significant statements to be found in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Chandlerwere relegated to footnotes. The Court appeared to conclusively determine that the circuit judicial councils were
designed and functioned as administrative bodies rather than as courts
of appeals en banc. 13 Thus, it is apparent that the councils possess
none of the judicial powers of an article III court. Their only source
of authority, therefore, can emanate from the statutes, and the only
statute granting a less than specific power is section 332.134 However,
this court for a formal order directing the issuance of the writ of mandamus
if the need therefor should arise.
Id. at 814 (emphasis added).
The district judge, Judge Van Dusen, was later to be one of the circuit judges who
played a major role in the Imperial controversy. It is also interesting that Judge Hastie,
dissenting in Rapp, chastised the majority for removing Judge Van Dusen who had not
violated any law but whose situation involved only the "appearance" of a conflict of
interest. Id. at 815-16. As a senior circuit judge, Judge Hastie was a member of the
three judge panel which later denied Nolan a stay of his removal in Imperial for precisely the same offense. Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500,
507 (D.N.J. 1972). One of the other two members of that panel, Judge Biggs, was with
the majority in Rapp. The other, Judge Mars, did not sit on that case. 350 F.2d at 808.
127 398 U.S. at 79.
128 This order was issued on February 4, 1966. Id. at 80.
129 Id. at 79-80.
180 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966). There
was a strong dissent by Justices Black and Douglas who argued that the whole procedure
was unconstitutional and should be stopped eo instanto. Id. at 1004-06.
131 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
182 Id. at 89.
133 Id. at 83 n.5, 86 n.7.
134 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1970) with id. § 332(d).

COMMENTS

1974]

this statute's grant of limited powers to the councils would not appear
to even approach the general supervisory powers that the Court had
recognized as being vested in the courts of appeals. 135 One might conclude that, in the absence of necessity to increase the judicial efficiency
in the Western District of Oklahoma, the orders of the Tenth Circuit
council in Chandler were beyond the scope of its lawful powers.
The second issue ostensibly decided by the Court related to the
review available to a party aggrieved by council action. 13 6 Indeed, the
Court intimated possible avenues of review which might be available,
such as a council hearing 13 7 or an action in the nature of mandamus.13
However, the Court also inferred that the administrative action of the
councils may not be reviewable at all "when it deals only with the in13 9
ternal operation of a court.'
The last subject of note discussed by the Court in Chandler was
the general construction of section 332. The Court could not decide
whether Congress had given any thought to the enforcement of a
council order 140 or whether the statute was to be implemented by the
councils' promulgating regulations. 141 In sum, the Court approached
but did not reach the position of having to determine that the statute
142
was unconstitutionally vague.
The dissents of Justices Black and Douglas conveyed the impression that Judge Chandler had been unconstitutionally removed from
office 4 3-a point both Justices had made in the Court's earlier denial
of a stay. 4 4 Justice Harlan, who concurred in the result, however, differed sharply from the Court on the nature of the councils. It was his
firm conviction that the circuit judicial councils were article III
courts. 145 Perhaps such a determination resulted from the inescapable
135

La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). See note 157 infra.
U.S. at 87-88 & nn.8, 10.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 87 n.8.

136 398
'37
138

139 Id. at 88 n.10.

140 Id. at 85 n.6.
141 Id.
142 Id. The Court found:
Standing alone, § 332 is not a model of clarity in terms of the scope of the judicial councils' powers or the procedures to give effect to the final sentence of § 332.
Legislative clarification of enforcement provisions of this statute and definition
of review of Council orders are called for.
Id.
143 Id. at 136-41 (Douglas, J.,joined by Black,

J.);

id. at 141-43 (Black, J.,joined by

Douglas, J.).
144 See note 130 supra.
145 398 U.S. at 104-05. This conclusion was also reached by the dissent. Id. at 133
(Douglas, J., joined by Black, J.). The question of whether the circuit judicial councils are
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conclusion that otherwise, the Supreme Court could not review the
146
proceedings of council action.
The procedure utilized by the Tenth Circuit-a court order followed immediately by an order of the judicial council directed to the
judge-has not been critically evaluated by the Court. Nevertheless,

1 47
the necessity for the council action in Chandler must be questioned.

The mandates of the court of appeals, unless reversed by the Supreme
Court, were binding upon Judge Chandler. Hence, it was his duty as
a judge to carry out such orders. 148 Absent some compelling reason for
49
intervention, council action would appear to have been unnecessary.
administrative bodies or courts was given extensive treatment in Chandlerwith interesting
results. The Solicitor General of the United States, Erwin N. Griswold, determined that
they were courts of appeals, en banc. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 18,
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970). Professor Charles
Alan Wright, representing the Tenth Circuit council, concluded that they were not
courts, but administrative agencies. 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 84-85 (remarks of
Carl L. Shipley, Esq.). In their dissent from the Court's denial of a stay, Justices Black and
Douglas characterized the councils as administrative bodies, 382 U.S. at 1005. In their
dissent from this decision, they characterized it as a court of appeals, en banc. 398 U.S. at
133. Justice Harlan, who was not as rigid in his interpretation of the Constitution as
were Justices Black and Douglas, agreed with their latter view. Id. at 102 (concurring
opinion). Since the Court did not decide (as there was no need, cf. Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) whether the councils are courts or
administrative bodies the issue is technically open for re-litigation. Apparently, no one will
really know what the councils are until a majority of the Court is forced to decide that
issue. The passing of Justices Harlan and Black would appear, however, to tip the balance
in favor of an administrative body.
146 398 U.S. at 96. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) in which
Chief Justice Marshall stated:
To enable this court, then, to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction ....
. .. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and
corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that
cause.
147 See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970) which provides in pertinent part: "Each judicial
council shall make all necessary orders ...." (emphasis added).
148 See id. § 453. This section, which contains the judges' (and justices) oath of
office, requires a judge to "swear (or affirm) ... [to] discharge and perform all the duties
incumbent upon [him] ... agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States."
Id.
149 Situations do exist where council action would be desirable and necessary. If the
councils are deemed "boards of directors" for the circuits it would be their responsibility
to promulgate general circuit policy. In personam orders would become necessary only
to ensure compliance. Assuming, arguendo, that a policy of the Tenth Circuit required
all district judges to respond immediately to orders of the appellate courts, there was no
indication that Judge Chandler would not have promptly complied with the mandates in
Occidental and Texaco. If Judge Chandler was not complying with circuit policies, council
action independent of any particular case should have been commenced. Alternatively, had
the problems created by Judge Chandler's actions been case-related, the mandate of the
appellate court should have sufficed. See Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 814 (3d Cir.
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Indeed, had Judge Chandler been "unable" to carry out his duties,
the council would have been empowered to certify this disability to
the President in order to obtain a replacement judge. 15 If the judge
had been "unwilling" to carry out his duties, perhaps a council recommendation for an impeachment investigation would have been
appropriate.' 5 ' In either event, such council action would be in furtherance of its statutory duties. However, when the council acts in concert with the court of appeals, en banc, the appearance of an improper
1 52
fusion of article I and article III duties arises.
Once the Tenth Circuit determined that it possessed the "inherent
power" to effectuate interlocutory or otherwise unappealable relief
through the "All Writs" provision, it would appear that the court
itself rather than the council should have been concerned with the
enforcement of its mandate. 153 However, the enforcement of such orders
through the offices of an administrative body, such as the council, presupposes that the members of that body have the "inherent power" to
act in a situation in which statutory authority is lacking. However,
section 332 does not specifically authorize such action. Furthermore, to
permit the enforcement of judicial orders by a non-judicial body
would appear to violate the principle of judicial independence so
carefully nurtured by the courts. 54 Had the circuit council been composed of persons other than circuit judges, such "inherent power"
would be noticeably lacking. 155 Because the judges sit upon the council
as individuals rather than as a court, the situation should not differ.
1965). Thereafter, if the judge was dilatory in his compliance, a council order would
have been both desirable and proper. See id.
150 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1970).
151 Hearings on H.R. 5999, supra note 37, at 14; see 398 U.S. at 136 (Douglas, J.,
joined by Black, J., dissenting).
152 See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. at 591. The
Supreme Court in Chandler remarked that
nothing in the statute or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended
or anyone considered the Circuit Judicial Councils to be courts of appeals en
banc.
398 U.S. at 83 n.5. See note 145 supra. Therefore, it is imperative that the activities of
court and council be separate and distinct. Since the vesting of administrative powers
in article III courts would appear to be constitutionally invalid, concerted action by court
and council would also seem suspect.
153 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (enforcing Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), in Little Rock, Arkansas); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821) (enforcement of a writ of error in a state criminal case); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (enforcement of a writ of error in the state courts).
Cf. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 814 (3d Cir. 1965).
154 Cf. United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 40 (1852); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
155 Cf. 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 125-26 (remarks of Judge Walter E. Craig of
the District of Arizona).
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Moreover, as judges possess judicial authority only within the narrow
confines of the congressionally delegated jurisdiction, absent such jurisdiction, "inherent power" cannot exist.15 6
If the councils are to be regarded as courts, the action taken in
Occidental and Texaco, although perhaps unwise, would be within the
councils' power.I5 7 There would be no problem of the mixture of article I and article III functions and no constitutional problem of
judicial review. It was Justice Harlan's conclusion, in his concurring
opinion in Chandler, that the sponsors of the Administrative Office Act
had expected the councils to be a court, that such a designation was
necessary to preserve judicial independence, and that the use of the
terms "administrative" and "administration" in testimony before the
congressional committees was not, in itself, dispositive of the "nature
of the beast."'. 58 However, the majority has apparently rejected such
a determination and other courts have followed the Court's lead. 159
Nevertheless, Chandler graphically demonstrates the manner in which
a circuit court and council can appear to merge into one integrated
tribunal. Perhaps the overriding issue of judicial independence and
the superseding orders of the Tenth Circuit council persuaded the
Court not to reach the merits of the Chandler case, yet the Tenth
Circuit's practice would definitely appear to be in violation of the
principles of separation of powers.
156 See notes 60-74 supra and accompanying text.
157 The courts of appeals are regarded as possessing the inherent power to supervise
the district courts. This inherent power of appellate supervision had its genesis in a case
frequently cited by the Tenth Circuit, La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249
(1957). In that case a district judge had ordered certain antitrust cases for trial before a
master. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus to the judge directing him to
vacate his order. Id. at 250. The Supreme Court held that the "All Writs" provision
empowered the courts of appeals to issue such writs in aid of jurisdiction. Id. at 255.
However, such writs were to be issued "only in the exceptional case where there is clear
abuse of discretion or 'usurpation of judicial power.'" id. at 257 (quoting from Bankers
Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)). The Court concluded, in a statement that would appear to provide a solid basis for council activists, that "supervisory
control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial
administration in the federal system." 352 U.S. at 259-60 (emphasis added).
The power of appellate supervision played a major part in the Chandler and
Imperial controversies. The Third Circuit has also considered cases dealing with this
power. See Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965); cf. United States v. Thompson,
483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973), motion for leave to file writ of prohibition and/or mandamus
denied sub nom. Luongo v. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 415
U.S. 911 (1974).
158 398 U.S. at 103 n.8.
159 Id. at 86 n.7; In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1973); ci.
Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
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Imperial "400"-The Council and Substantive Rights
The most recent example of council action to be challenged in
the courts involved Joseph M. Nolan, counsel for the reorganization
trustee in bankruptcy' 6 0 of Imperial "400" National, Inc., a national
chain of motels.18 ' The reorganization was originally commenced in
New Jersey in 1965 as a Chapter XI proceeding, but was later amended
to conform with Chapter X. Nolan and the trustee were appointed
in 1966, eight months after the original petition was filed. 62 The reorganization proceeding endured a long and tortured history which
3
ultimately induced the council's action. 6
Although ostensibly satisfied with the progress of the reorganization during the subsequent four years, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit asserted that administrative costs were
excessive. Consequently, the court of appeals reduced the interim fee
allowances which had been approved by the bankruptcy court and
awarded to the trustee and to Nolan, his attorney.6 4 The appellate
court also indirectly rebuked the trustee and Nolan in requesting that
they "make a greater effort to work with the creditors and other in'
terested persons."'

65

On remand, the reorganization court obtained reimbursement of
the excess fees it had previously awarded. However, the court ordered
that no interest on the reimbursed fees would be imposed upon the
trustee. 166 An appeal from this order was taken to the Third Circuit
but prior to oral argument, many events transpired which eventually
provoked the circuit judicial council into action.
In April, 1971, Schiavone Construction Company, a major client
of Nolan's law firm, expressed interest in proposing a reorganization
160 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 503 (D.N.J.
1972). The trustee, Thomas J. O'Neill, was also an attorney. Id. See generally Note, Review
of the Actions of the Judicial Council of the Circuit, 42 FORDHAM L. RaV. 477 (1973).
161 The corporation, through its motels, was doing business in 35 states. 481 F.2d
at 43.
162 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 503 (D.N.J.
1972).
163 See, e.g., In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 456 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1972) (court
required trustee and his counsel to pay interest on excess interim fee allowance repaid to
the estate); In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 432 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1970) (creditors successfully required the trustee and his counsel to repay excess interim fees); In re Imperial
"400" Nat'l, Inc., 429 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1970) (discusses procedural history of this bankruptcy case).
164 In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 432 F.2d 232, 237, 242 (3d Cir. 1970); see Nolan v.
Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 503 (D.N.J. 1972).
165 432 F.2d at 240.
166 In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 456 F.2d 926, 929 n.4 (3d Cir. 1972).
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plan. Nolan advised Judge Robert Shaw, the district judge supervising
the reorganization proceedings, of this development and, at the judge's
request, separated himself from the Schiavone negotiations. 16 7 However,
one major creditor, the Union Bank of Los Angeles, 168 insisted upon
Nolan's total abstinence from any reorganization plan. 1 9 Yet, it should
be emphasized that neither the Union Bank nor its attorney, Laurence
W. Levine, who had been engaged in continuous controversy with
Nolan, suggested his removal as counsel to the trustee at the time. The
Securities and Exchange Commission, a party to all Chapter X reorganizations, 170 concurred with the recommendations made by the Union
Bank. 171 Judge Shaw thereupon issued an order directing that Nolan
172
not participate in any plan of reorganization.
The Schiavone plan was filed on June 30, 1971.173 Notwithstanding

Union Bank's general approval of the plan, the bank's counsel and
Nolan continued their attacks upon each other. Under ordinary circumstances such behavior would not amount to much more than intemperate conduct between adversaries, but in this instance personal
attacks were being made in pleadings and briefs filed with the Third
Circuit court of appeals. 174 Immediately prior to oral argument, and
167 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 503-04 (D.N.J.
1972). At the request of Judge Shaw, Nolan sent a letter to the judge detailing the relationship between himself, his law firm, and Schiavone Construction Company. Nolan
requested Judge Shaw to delineate the extent to which he could consciously participate
in the aforementioned reorganization plan, and to notify all parties of the decision so that
the objections could be timely heard. Letter from Joseph M. Nolan, Esq. to Judge Robert
Shaw, April 19, 1971, reproduced in Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 65a-66a, In re
Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's
Appendix]. Judge Shaw responded with a letter to the trustee and his counsel, which was
later transmitted to all parties. In his letter, Judge Shaw requested that Nolan refrain
from participating in any action taken by Schiavone in connection with the reorganization.
Letter from Judge Robert Shaw to Thomas J. O'Neill, Esq. and Joseph M. Nolan, Esq.,
April 21, 1971, in Appellant's Appendix at 67a-69a.
168 481 F.2d at 43. Levine was constantly attacking the trustee and his counsel. It
was his attacks that precipitated the litigation over excess interim fee allowances. Nolan
did not field these attacks without reply. Id. at 43-44.
169 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.N.J.
1972); Letter from Laurence W. Levine, Esq. to Judge Robert Shaw, April 29, 1971, in
Appellant's Appendix at 72a-74a.
170 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1970).
171 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.N.J.
1972); Letter from Edwin H. Nordlinger, Esq., Chief Attorney of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, to Judge Robert Shaw, April 28, 1971, in Appellant's Appendix at
70a-71a.
172 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.N.J.
1972).
178 Id.
174 In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d at 44 & n.6. The attacks in Levine's
pleadings were alleged to be so vitriolic that Nolan eventually filed a motion to strike with
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despite ample opportunity for such a request in the formal pleadings,
Levine addressed a letter to the panel of circuit judges designated to
hear the oral argument in which he intimated that "the court 'could
exercise its equity power' to remove the trustee and his counsel, 'which
we hope it will and of its own volition.' ",175
The appeal was heard on January 27, 1972, before a panel of three
circuit judges, including Francis L. Van Dusen, Arlin M. Adams, and
Senior Judge Gerald McLaughlin. 176 A few days after oral argument
and before a decision was filed, Judges Van Dusen and Adams wrote a
letter to Chief Judge Collins J. Seitz of the Third Circuit in which
they noted the delay in the administration of the estate and the friction
between Levine and Nolan.177 Their letter further suggested that
Nolan resign as attorney for the trustee. 178 The communication to
Judge Seitz concluded with the admonition that the public would not
understand Nolan's continued participation as counsel to the trustee
in view of this "appearance of impropriety."' 179 It was apparent that
Judges Van Dusen and Adams were seeking immediate circuit judicial
council action, for their letter concluded:
We bother you only because we believe the situation is urgent
and you are the Chief Judge. Because Gerry [Judge McLaughlin]
is not an active judge, we are not bothering him with a copy of
this letter but believe he would agree with its contents. 8 0
the Third Circuit. Motion and Appendix by Joseph M. Nolan to Strike Portions of the
Memorandum and Appendix of the Union Bank of Los Angeles, California, Appellant, In
re Imperial "400" Natl, Inc., 456 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1972) (reproduced in Appellant's
Appendix at 459a). The motion was denied, and in January, 1972, the matter was docketed
for oral argument. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., No. 71-1550 (3d Cir., Mar. 16, 1972)
(reproduced in Appellant's Appendix at 177a-78a).
175 481 F.2d at 44. Letter from Laurence W. Levine, Esq. to Honorable Judges United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, January 22, 1972, in Appellant's Appendix
at 179a-183a. In his letter Levine stated that there was "no Motion before [the] Court to
remove the Trustee and his counsel" and that he sought "no time to argue" such a point.
Id. at 183a (emphasis in original).
176 In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 456 F.2d 926, 928 (3d Cir. 1972). Judges Van
Dusen and Adams also participated in the appeals reported at 432 F.2d 232 (3d Cir.
1970) and 429 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1970).
177 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.N.J.
1972); Letter from Judges Francis L. Van Dusen and Arlin M. Adams to Chief Judge
Collins J. Seitz, January 31, 1972, in Appellant's Appendix at 90a-91a. This letter cited the
decision of a court to remove a trustee sua sponte, In re Schireson, 45 F. Supp. 416, 417
(E.D. Pa. 1940). Appellant's Appendix at 91a. The same cite appeared in Laurence W.
Levine's letter to these judges only nine days earlier. Id. at 181a. See note 175 supra.
178 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 504-05 (D.N.J.
1972); Appellant's Appendix at 90a-91a.
179 Appellant's Appendix at 90a.
180 Id. at 91a. Senior circuit judges are not members of the circuit judicial councils. 28
U.S.C. § 332(a) (1970).
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On February 10, 1972, still prior to a decision on the appeal, the
Judicial Council of the Third Circuit met to consider the problems
raised by the judges' letter. 81' The council decided to advise Judge
Shaw of their cognizance of the problems pertaining to Nolan's activities and proposed that "he [Judge Shaw] be instructed that it was their
belief that counsel for the trustee should be removed." 18 2 The council
thereupon passed the following resolution:
"RESOLVED that in all bankruptcy proceedings this Council holds
as incompatible the continued representation as attorney for the
trustee by any lawyer or his firm who represents a third party who
submits a plan for reorganization in the bankruptcy; and that the
recusal by the attorney only from commenting on proposed reorganization plans is not an adequate
immunization from the ap83
pearance of a conflict of interest.'
For his part, Nolan informed Judge Shaw that he did not wish to
comply with a request for resignation because such a response would
amount to "a tacit confession of wrongdoing.' 81 4 In his letter of
reply to the Chief Judge two weeks later, Judge Shaw maintained that
no conflict of interest existed. Moreover, the judge observed that the
action taken by Nolan and the court resolved "any conceivable conflict of interest, apparent or otherwise."' 185 Judge Shaw concluded that
181 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 505 (D.N.J. 1972).
The members of the council were Chief Judge Seitz, Judges Van Dusen, Aldisert, Adams,
Rosenn and Rosen. Judge Hunter was ill. Judge Gibbons was present but did not participate in any matters involving Imperial. He was formerly a partner in the trustee's law
firm. Minutes of the 187th Meeting of the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, February
10, 1972, appearing in Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500,
513-14 (D.N.J. 1972) (Appendix A).
182 346 F. Supp. at 514.
1a Id. Following the meeting, Chief Judge Seitz wrote a letter to Judge Shaw and
advised him of the council meeting and its resolution. Judge Seitz detailed the history of
the situation and concluded that the council had approved its resolution "[a]cting on
these factual bases and after elaborate discussion." Letter from Chief Judge Collins J.
Seitz to Judge Robert Shaw, March 10, 1972, in Appellant's Appendix at 19a-21a. The
letter summarized the resolution as follows:
"Where a law firm with which an attorney for a trustee in reorganization is associated represents any other entity involved in the reorganization proceedings and
such relationship may create the appearance of a conflict of interest, the attorney
for the trustee should not (sic] longer serve."
Id. at 20a. Judge Seitz concluded that he would suggest that Nolan be given an opportunity to resign and emphasized that the council "did not find that there was a conflict
of interest in fact but only [an] 'appearance' " thereof. Id.
184 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 505 (D.N.J.
1972); Letter from Judge Robert Shaw to Chief Judge Collins J. Seitz, March 22, 1972, in
Appellant's Appendix at 22a-26a.
185 Appellant's Appendix at 22a.
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Nolan's resignation under these circumstances would leave him under
a cloud of suspicion, as viewed both by the public and by the "Bar
and Judiciary" of New Jersey, and that if he were to be removed by
the court, "fundamental fairness [would] dictate that he is entitled to
186
a hearing upon notice.1
Judge Shaw's letter was discussed at the next meeting of the
Judicial Council of the Third Circuit on April 12, 1972. The council
reaffirmed the resolution adopted at its previous meeting which focused
upon the appearance of a conflict of interest. The council requested
Judge Shaw to "give the resolution appropriate consideration."' 18 Chief
Judge Seitz also reminded Judge Shaw that the resolution was directed
at the "appearance of a conflict of interest."'l8 Therefore, since Nolan
was not being removed for cause, a hearing would not be necessary.
Nolan thereafter filed a civil action with the district court on
May 2nd, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 89 However, Judge
Shaw, ostensibly compelled by the resolution of the circuit judicial
council, signed an order later that same day removing Nolan as attorney for the reorganization trustee without notice or a hearing. 190 The
order was stayed by Judge Shaw, but after an order to show cause had
issued, the stay was vacated. Again, Judge Shaw considered his action
mandated by the council resolution.' 9 '
186 Id. at 23a, 25a-26a. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(17) (1970) (removal of receiver or trustee
for cause requires "hearing after notice").
187 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 506 (D.N.J.
1972); Extract from Minutes of the Meeting of the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit,
April 12, 1972, in Appellant's Appendix at 92a-93a. Judge Hunter was present at this
meeting but did not participate because of a personal relationship with Nolan. Id. at 92a.
Following this meeting Chief Judge Seitz wrote again to Judge Shaw. He emphasized that
the council resolution (which was quoted in this letter and, thus was seen by Judge Shaw
for the first time) was intended to apply to the entire circuit. Letter from Chief Judge
Collins J. Seitz to Judge Robert Shaw, April 14, 1972, in id. at 27a-28a. Compare the
resolution quoted in id. at 28a with that quoted in id.at 20a.
188 Appellant's Appendix at 28a (emphasis in original). Chief Judge Seitz took pains
to point out that counsel for the trustee can be removed other than for cause. Id.
189 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 507 (D.N.J.
1972).
190 Id.; In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., No. B656-65 (D.N.J., May 2, 1972) (reproduced in Appellant's Appendix at 3a-5a). The order recited the fact that Judge Shaw
considered his order limiting Nolan's functions as providing protection against both a
conflict of interest and the appearance thereof. Judge Shaw determined that the council's
resolution overruled his previous opinion and thus "mandate[d] termination of the
services of Joseph M. Nolan, Esq., as counsel for the Trustee." Id. at 4a. Judge Shaw
considered it to be his duty to enforce that mandate. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970).
191 Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 346 F. Supp. 500, 507 (D.N.J.
1972); In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., No. B656-65 (D.N.J., May 11, 1972) (reproduced in
Appellant's Appendix at 13a-15a); Transcript of Hearing on Order to Show Cause, In re
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Chief Judge Anthony Augelli, of the District of New Jersey, requested the assignment of a district judge from outside the Third
192
Circuit to hear Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit.
Simultaneously, Nolan attempted to appeal and/or stay his dismissal
in both the court of appeals and Supreme Court.193 His efforts were
totally unsuccessful. In July; 1972, Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, sitting
by designation, granted a motion for summary judgment submitted by
1 94
the defendant circuit judicial council.
Several important points regarding the review of council orders
were made by Judge Thomsen in his opinion. Of primary significance
was his determination that the order terminating Nolan's services as
attorney for the reorganization trustee was fully reviewable by appeal
in the court of appeals.19 5 This, of course, raises the question of the
appropriate composition of the tribunal hearing the appeal-whether
the members of the council who ordered Nolan's removal should thereafter sit as a court to review their own order. 9 6 Also of importance
was, Judge Thomsen's determination that it would be most inapproImperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., No. B656-65 (D.N.J., May 11, 1972) (reproduced in Appellant's
Appendix at 30a-40a).
192 346 F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J. 1972), afl'd sub nom. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc.,
481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Union Bank v. Nolan, 414 U.S. 880 (1973)..
193 A motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus
was denied by the Supreme Court on October 10, 1972. Nolan v. Judicial Council of the
Third Circuit, 409 U.S. 822 (1972). His application for a stay of Judge Shaw's order was
denied by the Court on May 29, 1972. Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, 406
U.S. 956 (1972). The Third Circuit denied Nolan's application for a stay on May 15, 1972.
In re Imperial "400" Natl, Inc., No. 72-1399 (3d Cir., May 15, 1972). Nolan also appealed
the order of Judge Shaw vacating his stay. The order was affirmed by the court of appeals
on June 20, 1972. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., No. 72-1399 (3d Cir., June 20, 1972).
In both of the cases in the court of appeals, the panel was composed of three senior
circuit judges (Biggs, Mars and Hastie), none of whom were members of the circuit
judicial council. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1970).
194 346 F. Supp. at 513. Senior Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, of the District of Maryland,
was designated by Chief Justice Burger on June 9, 1972. Appellant's Appendix at 75a-76a.
195 346 F. Supp. at 512.
196 There is some statutory authority which would suggest that this condition should
never occur. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1970), which provides in part: "No judge shall hear or
determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him."; id. § 455 (1970)
which provides:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a
material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney
as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or
other proceeding therein.
Some standards for disqualification under the latter statute may be found in Rapp v.
Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965). For a contrary view of this issue (i.e., the
council could sit as a court to determine the fate of their resolution), see In re Imperial
"400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d at 49 n.1 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
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priate for a district court to interfere with the decision made by another judge sitting in the same court. He thus concluded that a
declaratory judgment action was not a substitute for a proper appeal,
and that Judge Shaw's order must be given res adjudicata effect unless
and until it be reversed or modified upon appeal.1 97 Judge Thomsen
also ruled that the district court's jurisdiction under the Administrative
200
Procedure Act 9 8 and the "All Writs" provision 199 was lacking.
Nolan appealed this adverse decision and the order of Judge Shaw
terminating his retainer. He had previously filed a motion in the court
of appeals requesting that all Third Circuit judges, both active and
senior, be disqualified. 201 Although Nolan's motion was never decided
by the court, the Chief Justice of the United States designated three
20 8
senior circuit judges202 to hear In re. Imperial "400" National, Inc.
The Third Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed the summary judgment
order of the district court but remanded the proceedings to that court
for an evidentiary hearing on Nolan's dismissal. 20 4 Petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court but were subsequently denied. 20 5 Moreover, the hearing ordered below by the court of appeals
was never held.
346 F. Supp. at 512.
5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
199 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
200 346 F. Supp. at 512-13. However, Judge Thomsen did not determine whether
mandamus, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), was a proper remedy, but, in any event, determined
that it was not an appropriate one.
201 Motion for Disqualification of All Judges of the Third Circuit, Nolan v. Judicial
Council of the Third Circuit, No. 17-1920 (3d Cir., filed Sept. 20, 1972) (reproduced in
Supplemental Brief and Appendix for Petitioner at 48a-54a, Nolan v. Judicial Council of
the Third Circuit, 409 U.S. 822 (1972)).
202 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(b) (1970). The designated judges were Senior Judge
Bailey Aldrich of the First Circuit, and Senior Judges J. Edward Lumbard and J. Joseph
Smith of the Second Circuit. 481 F.2d at 42. Both .Judge Aldrich and Judge Lumbard are
former chief circuit judges who, thus, have headed their own circuit judicial councils.
id. at 45 n.10.
208 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.Union Bank v. Nolan, 414 U.S. 880
107
198

(1973).
204 481 F.2d at 49. The district court, upon remand, determined that no further
hearing was necessary. The court had considered "the files and records in this matter, including pleadings, correspondence, transcripts, briefs, appendices, exhibits and other
matters of record" in arriving at its decision. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., No. B
656-65 (D.N.J., May 16, 1974). Counsel for Nolan had written a letter to the court on
January 11, 1974, offering Nolan's resignation. Id. Therefore, on May 16, 1974, Judge Lawrence A. Whipple vacated Judge Shaw's order of May 2, 1972, which had terminated
Nolan's retainer, and accepted Nolan's resignation, thus concluding the litigation in this
case. Id.
205 Union Bank v. Nolan, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Judicial Council of the Third Circuit
v. Nolan, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
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The issues raised by Imperial are both complex in nature and
far-reaching in effect. The power of the circuit judicial councils to
make orders, the scope of such orders, the effect of such orders on
the substantive rights of those affected by the orders, and the nature
of the judicial (or administrative) relief, if any, afforded to those so
affected represent some fundamental questions. Regarding the power
to make orders, Judge Bailey Aldrich, speaking for the majority in
Imperial, said simply: "It cannot be unconstitutional to authorize the
courts to manage their own business. ' 20

6

Indeed, the Administrative

Office Act was created for just such a purpose. 20 7 Nevertheless, there
has always been confusion regarding the extent to which the authorized
powers were to be exercised. Since the situation in Imperial was not
brought to light as a result of the reports of the Administrative Office, °8
the council's power to act was limited to the end of "effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts. ' 20 9 It is doubtful
210
whether that end was successfully accomplished in Imperial.
The councils were apparently designed to possess the authority
to deal with ethical problems. 211 However, Nolan was not charged with
200 481 F.2d at 4. Such a statement is probably an oversimplification of the issue. The
executive branch was formerly charged with the administration of the judicial budget.
The executive annually submits a budget to Congress but it is the constitutional duty
of the latter branch to make appropriations as they see fit. When such appropriations
and expenditure authorizations are made mandatory, the executive has no power to
impound or withhold such monies as an incident to its management power over the
budget. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973). The
Supreme Court has recently agreed to decide this issue. Train v. City of New York, 42
U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1974). Thus, although the federal courts have been given
certain statutory authority for the administration of business, such authorization cannot
extend to matters delegated to another branch by substantive statutes duly enacted by
Congress.
207 See notes 17-44 supra and accompanying text.
208 Such reports would permit the council to "take such action thereon as may be
necessary." 28 U.S.C. § 332(c) (1970).
209 Id. § 332(d).
210 The Third Circuit council had noted that the Imperial "400" reorganization was
being drawn out over a long period of time. See In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 432
F.2d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 1970). However, the judges hearing the appeals were apparently
satisfied with the progress of the reorganization in 1970. Id. at 237, 242. Despite their
dissatisfaction two years later, the supervising district judge remained content. Judge
Shaw asserted that Nolan's dismissal was very detrimental to the estate. In re Imperial
"400" Nat'l, Inc., No. B656-65 (D.N.J., May 11, 1972) (reproduced in Appellant's Appendix
at 13a-15a). While Chief Judge Seitz, in one letter to Judge Shaw, wrote that he personally
hoped that the dismissal would not interfere with the reorganization, it would appear
that such a change, under those conditions, would not promote the effectiveness or the
expeditious progress of the reorganization. Letter from Chief Judge Collins J. Seitz to Judge
Robert Shaw, March 10, 1972, in Appellant's Appendix at 21a; see 481 F.2d at 48-49.
211 See 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 375 (remarks of Professor Peter G. Fish).
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a conflict of interest. His limited participation and his full disclosure
both to the court and to all parties concerned precluded such a conflict from ever coming into fruition. The "appearance" of a conflict
of interest while technically an ethical problem, is more properly considered to be a problem of image. Yet the image of the federal courts
would not appear to have been enhanced by the solution chosen by
the Third Circuit council. 212 Even assuming that the adoption of such
a solution was within the authorized functions of the circuit judicial
councils, a major issue remains whether such a resolution may be directed against a single party in substance while, in appearance, it is
designed to be effective in all district courts within the circuit. 218
The majority in Imperial recognized that the scope of the council's action "comes uncomfortably close, perhaps too close, to a function
denied to the Council, the exercise of 'traditional judicial powers.' ",214
It is difficult to imagine a manner in which the Third Circuit council
could have come any closer without crossing that line, if in fact it had
not already been crossed. The council had of course based its determination upon a particular set of facts before it. Although such action,
by itself, would not inherently be reflective of a judicial determination,21 5 the selection, however, of a remedy affecting the substantive
rights of a party in the absence of definitive statutory guidelines necessarily classifies the resultant decision as one judicial in nature. 216
In ordering Nolan removed from his position, the council appeared
to have judicially reviewed the prior order of the district judge. Judge
Shaw had previously determined that Nolan's limited participation
in the proceedings would not have created an unethical situation. 217
The judge had also determined that Nolan's experience and knowledge
2 18
were important to the successful termination of the reorganization.
However, the judicial council, based upon its own limited review of the
facts, and without a hearing, arrived at a contrary determination. Such
action must be regarded as a de facto review of Judge Shaw's decision.
However, even if the resolution of the Third Circuit council be
viewed as an administrative order, rather than a judicial decision, the
council may have gone beyond its statutory authority in promulgating
See 481 F.2d at 47.
Id. at 47; id. at 50 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 47 (quoting from Chandler, 398 U.S. at 86 n.7).
215 Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
216 See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 588 n.22 (1974).
217 Transcript of Hearing on Order to Show Cause, In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc.,
No. B656-65, at 6 (D.N.J., May 11, 1972) (reproduced in Appellant's Appendix at 35a).
218 Id. at 7 (reproduced in Appellant's Appendix at 36a).
212

213
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it. The power of the judicial council to issue general orders affecting
the administration of business within its circuit was upheld by the appeals court. 219 The circuit judicial councils have not been authorized,
however, to promulgate general orders dealing with substantive areas
of bankruptcy law. 22 0 An administrative agency may only issue orders
within the scope of its statutory authorization. 221 Congress has enacted
specific statutes which prescribe the qualifications and procedures for
appointment as trustee's counsel in reorganization matters. 222 Where
discretion has been authorized by those statutes, such discretion has
been vested solely in the district judge supervising the reorganization. 228
Thus, the council's action in removing Nolan may be viewed as an
unauthorized administrative disregard of the legislative mandate.
Moreover, the order issued in Imperial was but tangentially related to the other district courts in the Third Circuit. It was directed
specifically at Nolan. 224 Such action, which is akin to administrative
adjudication, was as the court of appeals had determined, deficient in
due process considerations. 225 It was, perhaps, a result of this problem
which engendered Nolan's difficulty in attempting to secure review of
his removal.
Judicial review, for which no provision is made in section 332,226
was a matter of concern to Nolan. Judicial review of council orders
has become a perplexing labyrinth. Nolan, among other efforts, had
filed a declaratory judgment action in the district court. 227 This action
required a district judge to review the orders of the council, composed of circuit judges-one level higher in the federal judicial hierarchy. Although the circuit judges, when functioning as a council,
do not sit as a court, it would appear to be most uncomfortable for a
district judge to review the orders of judges who are nominally his
22
superiors.
219 481 F.2d at 46; id. at 50 (dissenting opinion); see In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc.,
486 F.2d at 297 (petition for rehearing).
220 See note 51 supra.
221 See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 345 (1955); FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.,
347 U.S. 284, 297 (1954).
222 Eg., 11 U.S.C. § 557 (1970) (appointment of attorney for trustee); id. § 558
(interest of persons appointed under §§ 556, 557); see GENERAL ORDER 44 (1970) (repro-

duced in Appendix to 11 U.S.C. (1970), General Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy).

E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 557 (1970).
481 F.2d at 47.
Id. at 47-48.
Cf. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. at 85 n.6.
346 F. Supp. at 501.
It should be noted that U.S. CONSr. art. III makes no differentiation between the
judges of the various "inferior Courts." Such differentiation has arisen from statutory
223
224
225
226
227
228
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The appeals from the district court's decision, and from Judge
Shaw's termination order were docketed in the court of appeals. 229
Therefore, unless the active circuit judges recused themselves, the appeal would be heard by the same judges who initially forced Nolan's
ouster. Under such circumstances, the members of the council may be
viewed as possessing "a substantial interest" in the outcome which
would warrant their disqualification. 2 0 Although senior circuit judges
of the circuit do not sit as members of the council, 28 ' they do maintain a close working relationship with their active brethren. They sit
together on panels and may sit, on limited occasions, with the entire
court, en banc. 28 2 Because of this relationship, it may well be improper
to permit the senior judges to sit in review of a council order or appeal from the implementation of such an order.
The procedure employed in the Imperial appeal involved the
designation of a panel of senior circuit judges from outside the Third
Circuit.283 This, of course, would remove the potential of direct in-terest. However, there remains the possibility of institutional bias. The
panel who sat on Imperial included judges who had headed their own
circuit judicial councils.3 4 In addition, both Judge Aldrich and Judge
Lumbard had testified before a subcommittee of the United States
Senate regarding the powers and functions of the councils. 2 3 Moreover, Judge Lumbard had served on the Committee on Court Administration of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 2 0 These
distinctions. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 44(d) (1970) which provides: "Each circuit judge shall
receive a salary of $33,000 a year," with id. § 135 which provides: "Each judge of a district
court of the United States shall receive a salary of $30,000 a year" [currently $42,500 and
$40,000 respectively]. Hierarchial influence has also been legitimized in court opinions. E.g.,
La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. at 94 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also 1970 Hearings, supra note 3,
at 79 (remarks of Judge Lumbard); Note, supra note 160, at 491.
229 481 F.2d at 42.
280 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
231 Id. § 332(a).
232

Id. § 46(c).

238

481 F.2d at 42, 45.

234

Id. at 45 n.10.

1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 56-82 (Judge Lumbard); id. at 353-71 (Judge
Aldrich). Judge Lumbard may be regarded as a council activist. Id. at 59 (seeks subpoena
power for councils). Judge Aldrich might be considered to be more passive in his outlook.
Id. at 356-57, 366. With respect to compliance by district judges Judge Aldrich once said:
"I think if a district judge tells us to go to hell, he tells us to go to hell." Id. at 366.
236 Id. at 62 (members of the Judicial Conference of the United States, March 1970,
and Judicial Conference Committees). Judge Aldrich served as a member of the Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System. Id. at 64. Judge Roszel C.
Thomsen, the district judge who decided Nolan's declaratory judgment action served on
the special committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States which issued the
235
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eminent judges have been involved for many years in the improvement
of the federal judiciary, and have undoubtedly been concerned with
judicial administration at a policy making level. Therefore, they would
appear to possess "a substantial interest" in ensuring that the powers
of the circuit judicial councils were not eroded.
The decision of the circuit panel correctly noted that as an appellate court, they were directly reviewing only the decision of the district
court which removed Nolan. 23 7 However, there must have occurred, indirectly, a review both of the council resolution and the procedure
by which that resolution was promulgated.23 8 Regardless of the propriety of such review, Judge Lumbard, in dissent, has concluded that
239
a panel of circuit judges cannot reverse the decision of the council.
His observation must have been based, in part, upon a determination
that the council is, at the least, equivalent to a court of appeals en
banc. 240 Moreover, if his construction is to be followed by other circuits, the only forum available for review would be the council itself.
Nolan did not petition the council for review. 241 It is unlikely,
as Judge Aldrich's opinion for the majority suggests, that such action
would have proved productive. 242 As a result, a party in Nolan's position would be left without an article III court to adjudicate the merits
of his controversy and to provide any appropriate relief. Presently, it
would appear that the Supreme Court is powerless to entertain an
appeal or grant an extraordinary writ to review the action of a circuit judicial council. 243 Because the councils are conceded to be an
administrative body such review must, of necessity, be brought in the
Supreme Court as an original action. However, this type of case or controversy does not fall within the pertinent constitutional and statutory
description of such an action. 244 .Thus, unless the Supreme Court reverses itself and determines the councils to be article III courts, there
Report on the Responsibilities and Powers of the Judicial Councils. H.R. Doc. No. 201,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961). Judge Lumbard also served on that committee. Id.
237 481 F.2d at 42.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 50.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 48 n.10.
242 Id.
243 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. at 86.
244 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ci. 2, which provides in pertinent part:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. ...
The statutory compilation of the Court's original jurisdiction is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (1970).
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would appear to be no federal court in which a party in Nolan's
position could receive a totally disinterested hearing on the merits.
Although the court of appeals remanded Nolan's case to the reorganization judge for a hearing to determine whether the removal order
should bevacated, 245 a serious question which remained was whether
the council resolution continued to bind that district judge. Section
332 makes such resolutions binding upon all district judges within
the circuit.246 Thus, although the facts might show that Nolan's presence was more beneficial to the estate than his "appearance" of a conflict of interest was detrimental, the council resolution mandating his
dismissal must stand. Such a finding would not have placed Nolan
outside the scope of the resolution. 247 Therefore, he could not have
been reinstated by the district judge without that judge violating his
statutory duty of compliance. Only the council could have afforded
relief-by the withdrawal or amendment of their resolution.
CONCLUSION

If the councils are to function effectively it is incumbent upon the
circuit judges to actively assert the powers granted to them. The circuit judicial councils have, in fact, begun to vigorously exercise that
authority in the past decade. However, the powers which are authorized
by section 332 appear to be too vague 248 to prevent the circuit judges
from going beyond the scope of their authority in attempting to promote "the effective and expeditious administration of the business of
the courts. ' 249 If the powers granted to the councils are to be used for
the beneficial purposes which predicated their authorization, both the
legislative and judicial branches must cooperate, as they did in 1939
when the Administrative Office Act was passed, to assure the councils'
continued viability.
The judicial branch can aid in this endeavor by attempting to
work within the confines of the separation of powers doctrine. They
must strictly observe the article I-article III dichotomy which distinguishes the council from a court. Perhaps this can best be done by
the council adopting a policy of self-limitation upon the scope of their
245 481 F.2d at 49.

246 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970).
247 The resolution adopted by the Third Circuit council does not reflect such a
balancing test. See text accompanying note 183 supra.
248 See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. at 85 n.6.
249 28 U.S.C. § 382(d) (1970).
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activities. 250 This device might be effectuated by limiting formal council pronouncements to two categories: first, general, prospective rules
designed to be effective in all the district courts of the circuit, 251 and
second, specific orders, directed to individual judges, and limited to the
correction of a specific situation for which that judge can be held directly responsible. 252 Informal council persuasion, however, would
remain as the primary means of securing compliance.
The advantages of such limitations are multi-faceted. The informal
contact between the council representative and a district judge often
resolves a problem which the district judge may simply not have recognized as such. 258 The lack of attendant publicity would be appreciated by the judges who, after all, are subject to human failings and
would not wish those inevitable mistakes to be publically aired. In
many instances, formal disclosure of such problems would adversely
affect the public confidence in the federal courts, thus negating the
purpose that the council action sought to promote.
General council orders, dealing with housekeeping matters or
promulgating rules of procedure, are simply a means of unifying the
administrative activities within the circuit. As long as such rules do
not abridge the substantive rights of parties 4a or conflict with the federal rules of procedure 255 they are a workable means of complying with
the Administrative Office Act as well as fulfilling its objectives.
The greatest advantage, however, may be gained from the strict
limitation of in personam formal council sanctions. This limitation
would eliminate the controversy which arose from Imperial and which
might have arisen from Rodebaugh. First, it would have eliminated
most of the problems which have been encountered in the attempts
Cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1973). In this case the Second
Circuit council had promulgated "Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal
Cases." Id. at 355-56. Hilbert had been indicted for violation of the federal narcotics laws,
but because the government was. not ready for trial as mandated by Rule 4, Judge
Dooling dismissed the indictment. Id. at 356. The defendant was reindicted and attempted
to dismiss, arguing that Rule 4 precluded reindictment. Judge Dooling refused this
motion and Hilbert petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. Id. at 357.
The court, en banc, granted the writ over a dissent by Chief Judge Friendly. Id. at 362.
By promulgating general rules, the Second Circuit council was not placed in a position
where their prior action necessarily precluded the same judges from sitting as a court in
review. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970) (granting the courts power to issue rules).
252 See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 US. 74 (1970);
Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962) (council order to district judge
transferring his unfinished business to another judge).
253 See 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 121 (remarks of Judge Craig).
254 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970).
255 Cf. id.
250
251
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to secure enforcement of a council order. By directing the resolution
to a district judge or initiating an action for mandamus against the
affected party, a district judge, who could not be held directly responsible for the unsatisfactory condition, is placed in an untenable position.
The judge's desire to carry out the wishes of the council, either through
statutory compulsion 256 or hierarchial influence2 7 may well interfere
with his impartial adjudication of the merits of the matter.
Self-limitation would also obviate the problem of affording judicial
review. As there would be no order of the district court, none of the
problems which faced Nolan need have occurred. There simply would
be no requirement for judicial review. However, a problem would remain with respect to review of a controversy similar to that raised in
Chandler.25 Nevertheless, a self-limitation policy might also prove useful should there be a repetition of that unusual situation. By acting
with moderation, the Tenth Circuit council need not have removed
Judge Chandler from all cases then currently on his docket. The council might only have restricted the intake until his docket was clear. If
the delay became too pronounced, additional judges might have been
designated to assist with the backlog. 259 In addition, the council possessed the power to certify a disability and a fortiori Judge Chandler's
inability to carry out the duties of his office. 260 If, however, litigation
became inevitable, the present inadequacy of the provisions for review would require congressional intervention to alleviate the problem.
The sanctions applied by the councils in Rodebaugh and Imperial
might have been applied more properly through alternative means.
As a court reporter, Rodebaugh was subject to removal by the district
court.261 If he failed to carry out a directive of the Administrative
Office, that court should have removed him. There would have been
no need for council intervention unless the court failed to act. If
Nolan's position was held to be in violation of an ethical rule,26 2 both
the district court and the court of appeals could have exercised their
256

Id. § 332(d).

See 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 79 (remarks of Judge Lumbard).
If a proper council order directed to a judge has been challenged by him, there
would remain the need for an article III hearing to resolve the controversy. But see
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the United States, 398 U.S. at 88 n.10.
259 This was one of the original purposes of the Administrative Office Act. See
Chandler, supra note 20, at 185. The current provisions for such transfer are found in 28
U.S.C. §§ 137, 292 (1970).
260 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1970). See also P. FIsH, supra note 17, at 419.
261 See 28 U.S.C. § 753(c) (1970). See also P. FISH, supra note 17, at 420.
262 Nolan was charged with possessing the "appearance" of a conflict of interest. See
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 9 (1971).
257
258
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disciplinary powers. 281 If his conduct conflicted with his representation
of the reorganization trustee, the court of appeals could have made
that conflict the basis of a reversal. 264 In both cases Nolan would have
been afforded article III protection, with his right to appeal preserved.
The court of appeals could have accomplished the desired result through
the use of its "inherent supervisory power.

' 265

Again, council inter-

vention would have been unnecessary.
While this self-limitation policy would aid in preserving the distinction between court and council, it is not appropriate to require
the judiciary to shoulder the entire load. Much of the controversy
surrounding the circuit judicial councils stems from the language, of
section 332.2 66 When the Administrative Office Act was enacted, delay
of justice was, perhaps, the primary evil which the Act sought to
remedy. 267 It is obvious that this may no longer be true. In order that
the councils may effectively exercise their powers, Congress must amend
the statute to more clearly define the extent and limitations of the
councils' powers and responsibilities. Circuit judges must no longer be
required to speculate over the scope of their mandate, nor must they
feel constrained in their actions by the problem posed by the lack of
adequate judicial review. Congress need not specifically delineate the
councils' powers in detail, but it must, at the very least, define the outermost limits. It is suggested that those parameters be limited to a scrutiny
of the internal functions of the district courts, including those matters
for which the district judges may be held directly responsible.
Congress must also come to grips with the problems of judicial
review. Although the self-limitation policies previously suggested would
obviate much of this need, some provision is required in those circumstances where a controversy does arise. It is suggested that jurisdiction to review the orders of the circuit judicial councils, not dealing
specifically with the internal operations of the district courts,268 be
delegated to the courts of appeals. In order that institutional and other
biases be minimized, it is further suggested that the panels be composed of article III judges designated from courts not subject to circuit
influence, such as the Court of Claims.2 69 This would provide the
See 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 78, 80 (remarks of Judge Lumbard).
Cf. Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1973).
265 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957).
266 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. at 85 n.6.
267 See notes 34-42 supra and accompanying text.
268 398 U.S. at 88 n.10.
269 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1293 (1970) (jurisdictional base of the courts of appeals does not
include the Court of Claims). The same would hold true for the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. Id.
263

264
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minimal article III review required under the circumstances. Certiorari
jurisdiction might be delegated to the Supreme Court to enable that
Court to entertain an appeal or grant an extraordinary writ should the
necessity for such action arise.
Whatever changes are eventually made, reform is required. Controversies, such as those occasioned in Chandler and Imperial, have not
27 0
strengthened the federal judicial system. With a mounting caseload,
the federal courts are again facing a crisis similar to the one which
predicated the creation of the councils. If a cooperative effort between the legislative and judicial branches can be mounted to amend
section 332, the circuit judicial councils can safely flex their recently
discovered muscles, and continue their important role in the improvement of the federal judicial machinery.
Michael G. Kohn
270
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